Agenda

Friday, March 20:

11:30 - 1:00pm: Registration and Informal Lunch

1:00 - 1:10pm: Opening Remarks
Alvaro Sandroni

1:15 - 2:15pm: Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
Salvador Barberá, Dolores Berga, and Bernardo Moreno

2:15 - 3:15pm: This Time is Different... click here for the abstract
Nabil Al-Najjar

3:15 - 3:45pm: Break

3:45 - 5:30pm: Panel on the History, Motivations, and Contributions of Mechanism Design
(with 4:45-5:00 cocktail break)

Moderator: Tom Gresik
Beth Allen, Jerry Green, Ted Groves, Jim Jordan, Roger Myerson

6:00 - 6:30pm: Reception

6:30pm: Dinner in Honor of Stan Reiter

Host: Hugo Sonnenschein
Speakers: Donald Jacobs, Michael Chwe, Stefan Reichelstein, Mark Satterthwaite, Vernon Smith

Saturday, March 21:

7:00 - 8:30am: Breakfast available

9:00 - 10:00am: Experimentation with Career Concerns
Chen Cheng and Christophe Li

10:00 - 10:30am: Break

10:30 - 11:30am: Auctions with an Expanded Secondary Market: Incentives and Bulow Klemperer Results - click here for the abstract
Harrison Cheng

11:30 - 12:30pm: A Prior-Free Approximately Optimal Dominant-Strategy Double Auction
Simon Loertscher and Leslie Marx

12:30 - 2:00pm: Lunch
2:00 - 3:00pm: **Dynamic Mechanisms without Money**
Yingni Guo and Johannes Hörner

3:00 - 3:30pm: **Break**

3:30 - 4:30pm: **Contracts with Framing**
Yuval Salant and Ron Siegel

4:30 - 6:00pm: **Panel on Future of Conference and Mechanism Design**
**Moderator:** Matt Jackson
Andy Postlewaite, Roy Radner, John Ledyard, Leslie Marx

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**Sunday, March 22:**

7:00 - 8:30am: Breakfast available

8:30 - 9:30am: **Robust Contracts in Continuous Time**
Jianjun Miao and Alejandro Rivera

9:30 - 10:00am: **Break**

10:00 - 11:00am: **Selecting a Discrete Portfolio**
Wojciech Olszewski and Rakesh Vohra

11:00 - 12:00pm: **Persuasion, Transparency, and Commitment**
Timothy Feddersen and Ronen Gradwohl

12:00pm: Concluding Remarks: Scott Page; Informal Lunch