TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dor,Avi
AU  - Pauly,Mark V.
AU  - Eichleay,Margaret A.
AU  - Held,Philip J.
TI  - End-stage Renal Disease and Economic Incentives: The International Study of Health Care Organization and Financing
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 13125
PY  - 2007
Y2  - May 2007
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13125
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w13125.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Avi Dor
Professor and Director
Economics and Health Policy Program
George Washington University
2021 K street NW, Suite 800
Washington,  DC 20006
Tel: 202-530-2368
E-Mail: avidor@gwu.edu

Mark Pauly
Health Care Systems Department
University of Pennsylvania
208 Colonial Penn Center
3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA  19104-6218
Tel: NA
Fax: NA
E-Mail: pauly@wharton.upenn.edu

Margaret A. Eichleay
Arbor Research Collaborative for Health
315 W. Huron St.  Suite 360
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
E-Mail: margaret.eichleay@arborresearch.org

Philip J. Held
Arbor Research Collaborative for Health
1973 Robin Ridge Court
Walnut Creek, CA 94597
E-Mail: esrd@astound.net
AB  - End-stage renal disease (ESRD), or kidney failure, is a debilitating, costly, and increasingly common medical condition. Little is known about how different financing approaches affect ESRD outcomes and delivery of care. This paper presents results from a comparative review of 12 countries with alternative models of incentives and benefits, collected under the International Study of Health Care Organization and Financing, a substudy within the Dialysis Outcomes and Practice Patterns Study. Variation in spending per ESRD patient is relatively small and is correlated with overall per capita health care spending. Between-country variations in spending are reduced using an input price parity index constructed for this study. Remaining differences in costs and outcomes do not seem strongly linked to differences in incentives embedded in national programs.

ER  -