TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dyck,Alexander
AU  - Moss,David
AU  - Zingales,Luigi
TI  - Media versus Special Interests
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14360
PY  - 2008
Y2  - September 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14360
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14360.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Alexander Dyck
Joseph L. Rotman School of Management
University of Toronto
105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5S 3E6
Tel: 416/946-0819
Fax: 416/978-5433
E-Mail: adyck@rotman.utoronto.ca

David Moss
Business School
Harvard University
Morgan 261, Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
E-Mail: dmoss@hbs.edu

Luigi Zingales
Booth School of Business
The University of Chicago
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
Tel: 773/702-3196
Fax: 773/834-2081
E-Mail: luigi.zingales@ChicagoBooth.edu
AB  - We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests.
ER  -