TY  - JOUR
AU  - Courty,Pascal
AU  - Marschke,Gerald R.
TI  - On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14502
PY  - 2008
Y2  - November 2008
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14502
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14502.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Pascal Courty
European University Institute
Via della Piazzuola 43, 50133
Firenze, Italy
E-Mail: pcourty@eui.eu

Gerald R. Marschke
10 Betwood Street
Albany, NY 12209
Tel: 518/339-8679
E-Mail: gerald.marschke@gmail.com
AB  - We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium assortative matching takes place; more able physicians join occupations less exposed to moral hazard risk, face more powerful performance incentives, and are more productive. Under-consumption of health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk above a given threshold are not viable. The model offers an explanation for the persistence of distortions in the mix of health care services offered the differential impact of malpractice risk across occupations, and the recent growth in medical specialization.
ER  -