TY  - JOUR
AU  - Fong,Kyna
AU  - Schwarz,Michael
TI  - Towards an Efficient Mechanism for Prescription Drug Procurement
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14718
PY  - 2009
Y2  - February 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14718
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14718.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Kyna Fong
Department of Economics
Stanford University
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
Tel: 650/721-2851
E-Mail: kyna.fong@stanford.edu

Michael Schwarz
Yahoo! Research
2397 Shattuck Ave
Berkeley, CA 94704
Fax: 510/704-2401
E-Mail: mschwarz@yahoo-inc.com
AB  - This paper applies ideas from mechanism design to model procurement of prescription drugs.  We present a mechanism for government-funded market-driven drug procurement that achieves very close to full static efficiency -- all members have access to all but at most a single drug -- without distorting incentives for innovation.
ER  -