TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dincer,Nergiz
AU  - Eichengreen,Barry
TI  - Central Bank Transparency: Causes, Consequences and Updates
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 14791
PY  - 2009
Y2  - March 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14791
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w14791.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Nergiz Dincer
T.R. Prime Ministry State Planning Organization
Necatibey cad. No:108, Yucetepe
06100, Ankara, TURKEY
E-Mail: nergiz.dincer@gmail.com

Barry Eichengreen
Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
549 Evans Hall 3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
Tel: 510/642-2772
Fax: 510/643-0926
E-Mail: eichengr@econ.Berkeley.edu
AB  - We present updated estimates of central bank for 100 countries up through 2006 and use them to analyze both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric framework.   We establish that there has been significant movement in the direction of greater central bank transparency in recent years.  Transparent monetary policy arrangements are more likely in countries with strong and stable political institutions.  They are more likely in democracies, with their culture of transparency.  Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that more transparency monetary policy operating procedures is associated with less inflation variability though not also with less inflation persistence.
ER  -