TY  - JOUR
AU  - Razin,Assaf
AU  - Sand,Edith
TI  - Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: Political-Economy Effect
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15013
PY  - 2009
Y2  - May 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15013
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15013.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Assaf Razin
Department of Economics
Cornell University
Uris 422
Ithaca, NY 14853
Tel: 607/255-9625
Fax: 607/255-2818
E-Mail: ar256@cornell.edu

Edith Sand
Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Tel Aviv University
Tel Aviv 69978,
ISRAEL
E-Mail: edit@post.tau.ac.il
AB  - The pay-as-you-go social security system, increasingly burdened by dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants whose birth rates exceed those of the native born birth. The paper examines adynamic political-economy mechanism through which the social security system influences the young decisive voter's attitudes in favor of a more liberal immigration regime. A Markov equilibrium with social security consists of a more liberal migration policy, than a corresponding equilibrium with no social security. Thus, the social security system effectively provides an incentive to liberalize migration policy through a political-economy mechanism.
ER  -