TY  - JOUR
AU  - Bagwell,Kyle
AU  - Staiger,Robert W.
TI  - Delocation and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15444
PY  - 2009
Y2  - October 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15444
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15444.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Kyle Bagwell
Department of Economics
Stanford University
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel: (650) 723-3251
E-Mail: kbagwell@stanford.edu

Robert W. Staiger
Department of Economics
Stanford University
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA  94305-6072
Tel: 650/723-0533
Fax: 650/725-5702
E-Mail: rstaiger@stanford.edu
AB  - We consider the purpose and design of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive environments featuring firm-delocation effects. In both the segmented-market Cournot and the integrated-market monopolistic competition settings where these effects have been identified, we show that the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficiency attributable to the terms-of-trade externality, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. Furthermore, and again as in the perfectly competitive benchmark case, we show that the principle of reciprocity is efficiency enhancing, as it serves to "undo" the terms-of-trade driven inefficiency that occurs when governments pursue unilateral trade policies. Our results therefore indicate that the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements applies to a broader set of market structures than previously thought.
ER  -