@techreport{NBERw15486,
 title = "Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers",
 author = "Carol McAusland and Peter J. Kuhn",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "15486",
 year = "2009",
 month = "November",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w15486",
 abstract = {We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.},
}