TY  - JOUR
AU  - Burger,Nicholas E.
AU  - Kolstad,Charles D.
TI  - Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 15543
PY  - 2009
Y2  - November 2009
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15543
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w15543.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Nick Burger
RAND Corporation
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington VA 22202-5050
Tel: 805.636.9495
E-Mail: Nicholas_Burger@rand.org

Charles D. Kolstad
Department of Economics
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
Tel: 805/893-2108
Fax: 805/893-8830
E-Mail: kolstad@econ.ucsb.edu
AB  - The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods.  Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates.  We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size.  We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good.  Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size.
ER  -