@techreport{NBERw6115,
 title = "Violations of the `Rules of the Game' and the Credibility of the Classical Gold Standard, 1880-1914",
 author = "Michael D. Bordo and Ronald MacDonald",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "6115",
 year = "1997",
 month = "July",
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w6115",
 abstract = {This paper examines the recently noted finding that the Classical gold standard represented a credible, well-behaved target zone system from the perspective of the well-documented failure of countries to play by the rules of the game in the classical period.  In particular, we test an hypothesis of Svensson (1994) that a credible target zone can confer on a country a degree of independence in the operation of its monetary policy.  We propose a number of ways of testing this proposition and implement them for a newly created monthly data base over the period 1880-1913.  We demonstrate that the Classical gold standard worked in the way predicted by Svensson's model.  This would seem to have an important bearing on the kind of institutional framework required for a modern day target zone (such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System) to function effectively and, in particular, to weather speculative attacks.},
}