TY - JOUR AU - Saffer,Henry AU - Chaloupka,Frank TI - Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Illicit Drugs JF - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series VL - No. 6432 PY - 1998 Y2 - February 1998 UR - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6432 L1 - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6432.pdf N1 - Author contact info: Henry Saffer NBER 365 Fifth Avenue, 5th Floor New York, NY 10016-4309 Tel: 212/817-7956 Fax: 212/817-1597 E-Mail: hsaffer@gc.cuny.edu Frank J. Chaloupka, IV University of Illinois at Chicago Department of Economics (m/c 144) College of Liberal Arts and Sciences 601 S. Morgan Street, Room 713 Chicago, IL 60607-7121 Tel: 312/413-2287 Fax: 312/996-3344;630/801-8870 E-Mail: fjc@uic.edu M1 - published as Henry Saffer, Frank J. Chaloupka. "Demographic Differentials in the Demand for Alcohol and Illicit Drugs," in Frank J. Chaloupka, Michael Grossman, Warren K. Bickel and Henry Saffer, editors, "The Economic Analysis of Substance Use and Abuse: An Integration of Econometrics and Behavioral Economic Research" University of Chicago Press (1999) M2 - featured in NBER digest on 1998-09-01 AB - The purpose of this paper is to estimate demographic differentials in alcohol and illicit drug use, participation, own price effects and cross price effects. This paper uses a data set of over 49,000 individuals from the National Household Survey of Drug Abuse and links drug and alcohol prices and policies to the individual records. The size of this data set makes it possible to estimate use, participation and demand curves for specific demographic groups. Public policies designed to reduce substance abuse have been oriented towards increasing the price of alcohol and illicit drugs. Little, however, is known about the relative responsiveness of various demographic groups to these policies. The data show that racial and ethnic minorities consume more cocaine, but consume less or equal amounts of alcohol, marijuana and heroin than the total population. The results also show a consistent pattern of negative own price effects for alcohol and illicit drugs and complimentarity between alcohol and illicit drugs. The own price effects did not differ substantially between demographic groups suggesting that price policies have a similar effect on all demographic groups. The pattern of complimentarity between alcohol and illicit drugs suggest that alcohol taxes also reduce drug use. ER -