TY  - JOUR
AU  - Persson,Torsten
AU  - Tabellini,Guido
TI  - The Size and Scope of Government:  Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians
JF  - National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series
VL  - No. 6848
PY  - 1998
Y2  - December 1998
UR  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6848
L1  - http://www.nber.org/papers/w6848.pdf
N1  - Author contact info:
Torsten Persson
Torsten and Ragnar Soderberg Chair in Economic Sci
Institute for International Economic Studies
Stockholm University
SE-106 91 Stockholm
SWEDEN
Tel: +46 8 163066
Fax: +46 8 6747801
E-Mail: Torsten.Persson@iies.su.se

Guido Tabellini
IGIER Universita' Bocconi
Via Roentgen 1
20136 Milano
Italy
Tel: 39 2 583 6 3305; fax 3302
E-Mail: guido.tabellini@unibocconi.it
AB  - We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system.  A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian -- as opposed to proportional -- elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts.  This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government.  A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential -- as opposed to parliamentary -- regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters.  This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians redistribution, and smaller government.  We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods.
ER  -