# ONLINE APPENDIX

表 2-2-1　三河县 1946 年土地改革前后各阶级土地占有情况变化表

| 项目 / 阶级成分 | 户数 | 人口 | | 土地改革前 | | | 土地改革后 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 人口 | 占全县总人口% | 占有土地（亩） | 占全县总土地% | 每人平均土地（亩） | 占有土地（亩） | 占全县总土地% | 每人平均土地（亩） | |
| 地主 | 694 | 5504 | 2.5 | 81863.9 | 12.6 | 14.87 | 22023.7 | 3.4 | 4 | Landlords |
| 富农 | 2849 | 18710 | 8.7 | 135640.53 | 20.8 | 7.25 | 94904.42 | 14.7 | 5.07 | Rich peasants |
| 中农 | 13173 | 71364 | 33.2 | 236716.77 | 36.4 | 3.32 | 240549.84 | 37.3 | 3.37 | Middle peasants |
| 贫农 | 24327 | 119565 | 55.6 | 196673.34 | 30.2 | 1.64 | 287418.43 | 44.6 | 2.4 | Poor peasants |
| 总计 | 41043 | 215134 | | 650894.56 | | 3.03 | 644896.39 | | 3 | Total |
| | # house-holds | # individuals | % | Land area (*mu*) | Land area (%) | Land per person (*mu*) | Land area (*mu*) | Land area (%) | Land per person (*mu*) | Item / Class status |
| | | Population | | Pre-Land Reform | | | Post-Land Reform | | | |

**Figure A.1:** Sample of County Gazetteer's record on land distribution before and after the Land Reform.

邹城市志 99

# 卷四 农 业

## 第一章 生产关系变革

### 第一节 封建生产关系

民国时期，邹县农村封建生产关系仍占主导地位。土地改革前，邹县境内地主、富农总人口数为 20990 人，占全县人口总数的 6.3%，占有耕地 74226 亩，占全县耕地面积的 11.4%，人均占有耕地 3.5 亩；中农总人口数为 147895 人，占全县人口总数的 44.3%，占有耕地 74226 亩，占全县耕地面积的 51.8%，人均占有耕地 2.3 亩；贫农总人口数为 164005 人，占全县人口总数的 49%，占有耕地 240394 亩，占全县耕地面积的 36.6%，人均占有耕地 1.4 亩；雇农总人口为 1393 人，占全县人口总数的 0.4%，占有耕地 1522 亩，占全县耕地面积的 0.2%，人均占有耕地仅为 1.09 亩。有的村庄更甚。据 1951 年 4 月，对邹县境内来傅、傅家堂、小贾庄、大黄庄、大屈庄、郭家庄 6 个自然村的调查表明，土地改革前，上述 6 个自然村的地主、富农总人口为 674 人，占有耕地 22795 亩，人均占有耕地 33.8 亩；中农、贫农、雇农总人口为 5995 人，占有耕地 8605 亩，人均占有耕地 1.4 亩。地主、富农人均占有耕地是中农、贫农、雇农人均占有土地的 24 倍强。

受封建土地所有制的压迫，无地、少地的农民迫于生计，只得靠租种地主的土地，忍受严重的超经济剥削。本县农村租佃形

Before the land reform, Zou County had 20990 landlords and rich peasants who accounted for 6.3% of the population and owned 74226 mu, 11.4% of total arable land, and 3.5 mu per capita.

的一场革命。

1950 年 6 月，中央人民政府颁发《中华人民共和国土地改革法》。邹县成立土地改革委员会，广泛宣传土地改革法，并开办了两期干部训练班，轮训区、乡干部 300 余人。10 月，邹县确定 11 区（贾庄）为重点区，并在其 3 个乡进行土改试点。县委土改工作队与区干部共 105 人分驻各乡。试点于是年 12 月底告一段落。1951 年 1 月，土地改革运动在全县范围内展开，至是年 12 月结束。

土改工作开展初期，地主阶级想方设法进行抵制对抗。对此，各级党委深入发动群众，与地主阶级展开面对面的斗争。逮捕恶霸地主、不法地主 440 人，交群众管制 1397 人，彻底摧垮了农村封建统治势力，保证了

**Figure A.2:** Sample of *County Gazetteer*'s record on land distribution before and after the Land Reform.




A. Unweighted




B. Weighted

**Figure A.3:** Comparison of province and county gazetteer land ownership data. The data are from the *Province Gazetteers* and *County Gazetteers*, respectively. Each observation is a province-period-class — see Appendix B.2 for further details. Weights in Panel B are the number of counties based on which the province-level data in the *Province Gazetteers* are computed (when this information is missing, we assume it is the same as the number of counties available in the *County Gazetteers*).




**Figure A.4:** This figure plots the probability density function of the average percentage land gain (% arable land in the county) for every 1 percent of the peasant population (in the hired, poor, and middle peasant categories) after the Land Reform across counties.




**Figure A.5:** This figure plots the pre-Reform Gini and the average percentage land gain (% arable land in the county) for every 1 percent of the peasant population (in the hired, poor, and middle peasant categories) after the Land Reform. The red line is the fitted line.




**Figure A.6:** This figure plots changes in Gini coefficient after the Land Reform (negative number means a decrease in Gini coefficient) relative to the pre-reform Gini coefficients. There are 252 counties that provide valid post-reform population and land data.




**Figure A.7:** This figure plots the elite class's advantage in contemporary income — the average difference in 2010 income between the elite class (defined as individuals from landlord or rich peasant households) and the non-elite class. The shaded area indicates the birth cohorts belonging to the "parents" generation.




**Figure A.8:** This figure illustrates graphically how individual-level persistence and county-level reversal can be reconciled.




**Figure A.9:** This figure plots coefficients from regressing the ratio between the $X^{th}$ and $50^{th}$ percentiles of amenity-adjusted housing area distribution on the pre-Reform land ownership Gini. Note that one needs to interpret positive coefficients as indicating a reversal between historical and contemporary inequality when $X < 50$ (the corresponding ratios are indicated by $^*$). Sample: counties with more than 80 households in the random 1% extract of the 2000 Census. The corresponding coefficients are reported in Supplemental Table S.7, Panel B.

**Table A.1:** Land ownership inequality: 1930s vs. 1950s

| *Panel A:* pre-Land Reform | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Share of land area per landlord (pre-Land Reform) | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Share of land area per owner (1930) | 0.078** | 0.074* | 0.083** | 0.082** | 0.075** |
| | (0.037) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.036) |
| # observations | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 41 |
| *Panel B:* contemporary | | | | | |
| | Gini in 2000 (Amenity-adjusted housing area per capita) | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Share of land area per owner (1930) | 0.00041 | -0.00012 | -0.00015 | -0.00017 | -0.00045 |
| | (0.00038) | (0.00034) | (0.00033) | (0.00032) | (0.00031) |
| # observations | 138 | 138 | 138 | 138 | 104 |
| Control for geographic attributes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for region FEs | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for night light level | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 2000 GDP | No | No | No | No | Yes |

Notes: The land ownership data in 1930 is based on Buck's (1937) agricultural survey. Panel A (B) correlates the share of land area per landlord reported in the gazetteers (the amenity-adjusted housing Gini coefficient in 2000) to the share of land area per landowner reported in Buck (1937). Panel B restricts the sample to counties with at least 80 households in the random 1% extract of the Population Census *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.2:** County level summary statistics and balance table

Panel A: Summary Statistics

| | Sample 1: Counties with sufficient data | | | Sample 2: Counties with insufficient data | | | Sample 3: Counties with no data | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variable | Mean | SD | Obs. | Mean | SD | Obs. | Mean | SD | Obs. |
| Distance to Shore | 5.203 | 4.943 | 576 | 5.472 | 3.986 | 296 | 5.570 | 4.884 | 418 |
| Longitude | 112.419 | 6.968 | 576 | 112.56 | 6.650 | 296 | 111.628 | 8.818 | 418 |
| Latitude | 31.21 | 4.966 | 576 | 32.958 | 5.815 | 296 | 33.184 | 7.202 | 418 |
| 2000 GDP per capita | 5279.456 | 4171.236 | 531 | 4665.502 | 3309.318 | 269 | 4655.372 | 3279.397 | 379 |
| 2000 Avg. Night lights | 2.707 | 5.306 | 576 | 3.274 | 6.629 | 296 | 2.970 | 6.479 | 418 |
| 2000 Avg. Years of Edu. | 6.926 | 0.908 | 576 | 7.051 | 0.986 | 296 | 6.964 | 1.209 | 418 |
| 2000 Median Years of Edu. | 6.979 | 0.975 | 576 | 7.083 | 1.040 | 296 | 6.955 | 1.396 | 418 |
| 2000 Avg. Y. of Edu. (b. <1950) | 4.344 | 1.195 | 576 | 4.438 | 1.332 | 296 | 4.348 | 1.519 | 418 |
| 2000 Median Housing Area | 24.266 | 7.339 | 576 | 21.628 | 5.482 | 296 | 21.239 | 5.495 | 418 |
| 2000 Median Adj. Housing Area | 30.163 | 10.200 | 576 | 26.526 | 7.248 | 296 | 26.123 | 7.697 | 418 |
| 2000 Housing Gini | 0.324 | 0.029 | 576 | 0.315 | 0.028 | 296 | 0.306 | 0.030 | 418 |

Panel B: Balanced Test

| | Sample 1 = Sample 2 + Sample 3 | | | Sample 1 = Sample 2 | | | Sample 1 + Sample 2 = Sample 3 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Diff. | SE | p-value | Diff. | SE | p-value | Diff. | SE | p-value |
| Distance to Shore | 0.030 | 0.093 | 0.750 | 0.055 | 0.079 | 0.483 | 0.07 | 0.084 | 0.404 |
| Longitude | -0.044 | 0.122 | 0.718 | 0.053 | 0.102 | 0.605 | 0.132 | 0.109 | 0.224 |
| Latitude | -0.125 | 0.094 | 0.182 | -0.053 | 0.079 | 0.498 | 0.038 | 0.084 | 0.653 |
| 2000 GDP per capita | -61.583 | 249.495 | 0.805 | 126.573 | 193.903 | 0.514 | 254.603 | 207.672 | 0.220 |
| 2000 Avg. Night lights | -0.979 | 0.354 | 0.006 | -0.582 | 0.327 | 0.075 | -0.078 | 0.349 | 0.823 |
| 2000 Avg. Years of Edu. | -0.092 | 0.058 | 0.113 | 0.006 | 0.052 | 0.901 | 0.092 | 0.056 | 0.101 |
| 2000 Median Years of Edu. | -0.049 | 0.059 | 0.408 | 0.061 | 0.055 | 0.268 | 0.127 | 0.058 | 0.030 |
| 2000 Avg. Y. of Edu. | -0.012 | 0.079 | 0.876 | 0.089 | 0.068 | 0.187 | 0.151 | 0.072 | 0.037 |
| 2000 Median Housing Area | 0.8 | 0.398 | 0.045 | 0.903 | 0.308 | 0.003 | 0.589 | 0.329 | 0.074 |
| 2000 Median Adj. Housing Area | 0.927 | 0.543 | 0.088 | 1.124 | 0.422 | 0.008 | 0.821 | 0.451 | 0.069 |
| 2000 Housing Gini | -0.001 | 0.003 | 0.858 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.493 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.165 |

Notes: This table checks potential county selection bias due to partial unavailability of inequality data. Panel A reports summary statistics for three samples: Counties with complete data (Sample 1), Counties with incomplete data (Sample 2), and Counties with no data (Sample 3). Panel B executes three balance tests: Sample 1 = Sample 2, Sample 1 = Sample 2 + Sample 3, Sample 1 + Sample 2 = Sample 3. *2000 Avg. Y. of Edu. (b. <1950)* refers to the average educational attainment for cohorts born before 1950. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.3:** Cohort-specific income and education premium

| | Income | Education |
|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1930-1934) | 5231.830 | 0.115 |
| | (5701.534) | (0.075) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1935-1939) | 573.694 | 0.056 |
| | (1748.218) | (0.045) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1940-1944) | -1790.761** | 0.021 |
| | (906.126) | (0.031) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1945-1949) | -1681.932** | -0.012 |
| | (703.001) | (0.015) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1950-1954) | -1103.076 | -0.036** |
| | (1042.003) | (0.018) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1955-1959) | -711.768 | -0.047 |
| | (1299.792) | (0.033) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1960-1964) | -737.980 | -0.024 |
| | (1225.034) | (0.039) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1965-1969) | 367.116 | -0.037 |
| | (1589.179) | (0.025) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1970-1974) | 3313.838* | -0.004 |
| | (1731.597) | (0.031) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1975-1979) | 2820.358 | 0.023 |
| | (2354.677) | (0.041) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1980-1984) | -199.180 | 0.055 |
| | (2231.323) | (0.053) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1985-1989) | 2516.385 | 0.102* |
| | (2340.667) | (0.060) |
| Pre-revolution elite (1990-1994) | 669.716 | 0.068 |
| | (1535.490) | (0.048) |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households. The outcome in column 1 is the total annual labor income. The outcome in column 2 is the probability of completing secondary education. Each row represents a separate regression. All specifications include county fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.4:** Auxiliary outcomes for the parents and children generations of the pre-revolution elite

| | Both generations | | Parents generation | | | Children generation | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Elite class diff. | | Overall | Elite class diff. | | Overall |
| | Mean | Std | Coef. | Std. err. | Mean | Coef. | Std. err. | Mean |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| *Panel A:* post-revolution elite | | | | | | | | |
| Post-revolution elite | 0.110 | 0.312 | -0.068*** | 0.014 | 0.160 | -0.021** | 0.009 | 0.056 |
| *Panel B:* family composition | | | | | | | | |
| Number of siblings | 3.128 | 1.896 | 0.035 | 0.080 | 3.669 | -0.145** | 0.067 | 2.557 |
| Number of generations in household | 2.305 | 0.737 | -0.034 | 0.035 | 2.201 | 0.134*** | 0.027 | 2.415 |
| *Panel C:* retirement likelihood | | | | | | | | |
| Retired | 0.062 | 0.241 | -0.044*** | 0.010 | 0.096 | | | |
| *Panel D:* additional values | | | | | | | | |
| Important to become rich | 3.659 | 1.194 | -0.061 | 0.053 | 3.673 | 0.092 | 0.057 | 3.645 |
| Inequality is desirable | 3.032 | 0.980 | 0.069* | 0.038 | 3.109 | 0.060 | 0.048 | 2.949 |
| Competition is desirable | 3.809 | 0.685 | -0.001 | 0.028 | 3.825 | 0.075** | 0.032 | 3.792 |
| Willing to sacrifice material goods for child's education | -7.374 | 9.439 | 1.778** | 0.832 | -7.007 | 1.255* | 0.689 | -7.593 |
| *Panel E:* housing | | | | | | | | |
| House value as share of income | 181.153 | 5,848.214 | -24.910 | 29.950 | 90.097 | -150.915 | 113.436 | 246.842 |
| House rental value as share of income | 1.392 | 77.220 | 0.013 | 0.057 | 0.108 | -1.684 | 1.492 | 2.318 |
| *Panel F:* hunger | | | | | | | | |
| Experienced hunger during famine | 0.131 | 0.338 | 0.033* | 0.018 | 0.228 | | | |
| *Panel G:* family strength | | | | | | | | |
| Financial help from or to relatives | 2,001.186 | 7,948.696 | 454.858 | 320.844 | 1,966.463 | 331.380 | 421.534 | 2,037.976 |

Notes: Columns 3 and 6 (4 and 7) present regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households for the parents and children generations, respectively, controlling for cohort fixed effects and residence county fixed effects. Column 1 (2) presents the mean (standard deviation) across the parents and children generations, while columns 5 and 8 present sample means for the respective generations. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: parents (1940–1965 birth cohorts; N = 10,430) and children generations (1966–1990 birth cohorts; N = 9,844).

**Table A.5:** Parents generation — income accounting for retirement

| | Income | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Panel A:* age less than 55 | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | -1119.289 | -814.680 | -802.964 | -1082.811 |
| | (946.449) | (942.424) | (946.785) | (941.054) |
| *Panel B:* age less than 60 | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | -759.921 | -607.469 | -607.246 | -741.433 |
| | (746.185) | (740.781) | (743.573) | (743.992) |
| *Panel C:* outcome is total income | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 397.363 | 454.761 | 435.544 | 461.760 |
| | (418.712) | (416.483) | (416.614) | (417.891) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sector FE | No | Yes | No | No |
| Province×Sector FE | No | No | Yes | No |
| Migrants FE | No | No | No | Yes |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households. Panel A restricts analysis to only those younger than 55, Panel B to only those younger than 60, the standard age for retirement. Both Panels use the total annual labor income as the outcome. Panel C includes the entire sample of the parents generation, and uses total income (including pension and other non-wage income) as the outcome variable. All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. Column 2 additionally includes sector fixed effects; Column 3 includes province×sector fixed effects; Column 4 includes a migrant indicator variable, defining migrants as individuals whose current county of residence is different from their birth place. The mean of the dependent variable is RMB 11,628 (std. dev. 28,716). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: 1941–1965 birth cohorts; N = 10,429.

**Table A.6:** Robustness of pre-revolution elite's rebound

| | Total annual labor income | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Panel A.1:* children's generation as 1963-1987 birth cohort | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1675.130** | 1791.831** | 1740.392** | 1694.091** |
| | (801.318) | (797.180) | (798.826) | (799.536) |
| *Panel A.2:* children's generation as 1969-1993 birth cohort | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1942.361** | 2006.295** | 1989.603** | 1945.262** |
| | (881.870) | (874.383) | (877.967) | (880.763) |
| *Panel B.1:* alternate class label definition: self report elite | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1921.061* | 2037.501* | 1964.780* | 1921.495* |
| | (1115.471) | (1100.004) | (1097.690) | (1112.208) |
| *Panel B.2:* alternate class label definition: parents report elite, self does not | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 2045.619 | 2071.165 | 2096.191 | 2097.550 |
| | (1405.336) | (1412.527) | (1418.235) | (1409.464) |
| *Panel B.3:* alternate class label definition: landlord household | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1595.361 | 1669.239 | 1735.032 | 1602.970 |
| | (1272.599) | (1271.163) | (1283.233) | (1270.352) |
| *Panel B.4:* alternate class label definition: rich peasant household | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1873.227* | 1983.143* | 1907.247* | 1906.565* |
| | (1083.246) | (1074.738) | (1074.260) | (1080.951) |
| *Panel C.1:* outcome is log income | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 0.214*** | 0.222*** | 0.225*** | 0.217*** |
| | (0.083) | (0.082) | (0.083) | (0.082) |
| *Panel D.1:* spatial autocorrelation for counties within 50 KM | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1911.647** | 2006.355** | 1973.720** | 1933.005** |
| | (852.449) | (847.699) | (852.457) | (853.353) |
| *Panel D.2:* spatial autocorrelation for counties within 300 KM | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1911.647** | 2006.355** | 1973.720** | 1933.005** |
| | (924.290) | (938.499) | (959.021) | (927.974) |
| *Panel D.3:* cluster at province level | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1911.524* | 2006.232* | 1973.595* | 1932.799* |
| | (1008.248) | (1031.818) | (1060.916) | (1006.608) |
| *Panel D.4:* cluster at county level | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1911.524** | 2006.232** | 1973.595** | 1932.799** |
| | (845.829) | (845.465) | (846.286) | (843.393) |
| *Panel E.1:* weighted sample | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1735.299* | 1856.698** | 1821.461** | 1764.235* |
| | (914.021) | (905.860) | (908.487) | (912.325) |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Panel E.2:* over-sampled provinces only | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 2609.253** | 2709.580** | 2609.161** | 2532.109** |
| | (1262.709) | (1240.669) | (1235.702) | (1267.519) |
| *Panel E.3:* control number siblings | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1852.635** | 1952.094** | 1921.476** | 1873.821** |
| | (852.748) | (848.351) | (851.238) | (850.916) |
| *Panel E.4:* control number generations | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 2085.435** | 2164.887** | 2126.227** | 2103.055** |
| | (860.125) | (855.199) | (855.811) | (855.967) |
| *Panel F.1:* age and cohort fixed effects | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 2016.970*** | 2006.232** | 1973.595** | 1932.799** |
| | (626.940) | (850.087) | (853.432) | (852.810) |
| *Panel G.1:* province-specific cohort effects | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1783.010* | 1891.401** | 1863.666** | 1802.952** |
| | (916.384) | (911.313) | (912.700) | (909.619) |
| *Panel H.1:* control parents self-employed | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1751.527** | 1853.410** | 1834.064** | 1772.232** |
| | (864.785) | (858.677) | (858.562) | (862.471) |
| *Panel H.2:* control parents entrepreneur | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1934.323** | 2025.886** | 1995.351** | 1956.105** |
| | (857.051) | (852.681) | (856.030) | (855.368) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sector FE | No | Yes | No | No |
| Province×Sector FE | No | No | Yes | No |
| Migrants FE | No | No | No | Yes |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households for the children generation. Panel A.1 changes the sample birth cohorts from 1966-1990 to 1963-1987; Panel A.2 changes the sample birth cohorts from 1969 - 1993. Panel B.1 defines pre-revolution elites based on self-reported class label; Panel B.2 defines pre-revolution elites as those for whom either parent reports being an elite but lack a self-reported elite label; Panel B.3 restricts the pre-revolution elite label to only landlord households; Panel B.4 restricts the pre-revolution elite label to only rich peasant households. Panel C.1 uses log(income) as the outcome instead, N = 4,935. Panel D.1 accounts for arbitrary spatial autocorrelation at the county level (Colella et al., 2019) assuming any two counties further than 50 KM apart have zero correlation; Panel D.2 accounts for spatial autocorrelation at the county level, assuming any two counties further than 300 KM apart have zero correlation; Panel D.3 clusters standard errors at the province level; Panel D.4 clusters standard errors at the county level. Panel E.1 uses the CFPS person-weights to weight the regression; Panel E.2 restricts analysis to only the oversampled provinces in the CFPS (Liaoning, Shanghai, Henan, Guangdong, and Gansu); Panel E.3 controls for the number of siblings; Panel E.4 controls for the number of generations living in the household. Panel F.1 uses Panel data for the years 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2018 (the 2016 data is much smaller than the others) to include both cohort and age fixed effects within the regression. Panel G.1 adds province by cohort fixed effects. Panel H.1 controls for a dummy for whether either parent is self-employed; Panel G.2 includes controls for a dummy for whether either parent is an entrepreneur (runs

a ‘getihu’). Regression coefficients for pre-revolution elite (standard errors in parenthesis). All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. Column 2 additionally includes sector fixed effects; Column 3 includes province×sector fixed effects; Column 4 includes a migrant indicator variable, defining migrants as individuals whose current county of residence is different from their birth place. The mean of the dependent variable is RMB 11,628 (std. dev. 28,716). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: 1966–1990 birth cohorts; number of observations = 9,844.

**Table A.7:** Parents and children generations of the post-revolution elite

| | Both generations | | Parents generation | | | Children generation | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Elite diff. | | Overall | Elite diff. | | Overall |
| | Mean | Std. dev. | Coef. | Std. err. | Mean | Coef. | Std. err. | Mean |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| *Panel A:* Income | | | | | | | | |
| Annual labor income | 8,809.188 | 24048.929 | 6,875.085*** | 861.554 | 6,148.240 | 2,694.947*** | 989.590 | 11628.269 |
| *Panel B:* Labor market sector choices | | | | | | | | |
| Non-agricultural job | 0.399 | 0.490 | 0.154*** | 0.016 | 0.275 | 0.125*** | 0.023 | 0.509 |
| Change to non-agricultural job from parents | 0.164 | 0.572 | 0.103*** | 0.022 | 0.067 | 0.051 | 0.032 | 0.250 |
| Self-employed or employer | 0.106 | 0.308 | -0.026*** | 0.009 | 0.075 | 0.010 | 0.020 | 0.134 |
| Individually owned business | 0.058 | 0.233 | 0.012** | 0.006 | 0.047 | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.068 |
| Non-individually owned business | 0.033 | 0.178 | 0.008 | 0.005 | 0.027 | -0.003 | 0.008 | 0.039 |
| Employed in public sector | 0.043 | 0.202 | 0.026*** | 0.008 | 0.030 | -0.010 | 0.012 | 0.054 |
| Career prestsige score (ISEI) | 30.298 | 13.088 | 6.951*** | 0.588 | 27.978 | 4.608*** | 0.875 | 32.335 |
| *Panel C:* Educational performance | | | | | | | | |
| Years of education completed | 5.547 | 4.670 | 2.737*** | 0.116 | 4.419 | 1.259*** | 0.176 | 6.743 |
| Completed at least junior high school | 0.139 | 0.346 | 0.164*** | 0.010 | 0.102 | 0.102*** | 0.019 | 0.178 |
| Top quartile in math test score (2010) | 1.257 | 0.437 | 0.184*** | 0.011 | 1.163 | 0.122*** | 0.020 | 1.356 |
| Top quartile in reading test score (2010) | 1.435 | 0.496 | 0.207*** | 0.013 | 1.299 | 0.081*** | 0.019 | 1.580 |

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 present the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the variable for the parents and children generation combined. Columns 3 and 6 (4 and 7) present regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the post-revolution elite and non-elite households for the parents and children generations, respectively, controlling for cohort fixed effects and residence county fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: parents (1940–1965 birth cohorts; N = 10,429) and children generations (1966–1990 birth cohorts; N = 9,844). Note that Panel B contains only employed individuals (parents generation: N = 5,110; children generation: N = 5,820), except for "Individually owned business" and "Non-individually owned business," which are available at the household level (parents generation: N = 10,401; children generation: N = 9,822).

**Table A.8:** Migration in CFPS, by generation

| | Migration indicators | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Province level migration | | | | County level migration | | |
| | Born | Age 3 | Age 12 | Hukou | Born | Age 3 | Age 12 |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) |
| Panel A: Children generation | | | | | | | |
| Elite class | -0.010 | -0.008 | -0.012 | -0.001 | -0.049*** | -0.042*** | -0.053*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.007) | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.015) |
| Mean | 0.063 | 0.062 | 0.058 | 0.030 | 0.191 | 0.190 | 0.183 |
| S.D. | 0.242 | 0.241 | 0.234 | 0.171 | 0.393 | 0.392 | 0.387 |
| Panel B: Parents generation | | | | | | | |
| Elite class | -0.005 | -0.003 | -0.012 | -0.005** | -0.013 | -0.016 | -0.021 |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.002) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| Mean | 0.055 | 0.054 | 0.045 | 0.008 | 0.175 | 0.174 | 0.166 |
| S.D. | 0.228 | 0.225 | 0.208 | 0.091 | 0.380 | 0.379 | 0.372 |
| Panel C: Grandparents generation | | | | | | | |
| Elite class | 0.032 | 0.033 | 0.027 | -0.004 | -0.005 | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.009) | (0.032) | (0.031) | (0.033) |
| Mean | 0.134 | 0.133 | 0.122 | 0.014 | 0.285 | 0.282 | 0.274 |
| S.D. | 0.341 | 0.340 | 0.327 | 0.116 | 0.451 | 0.450 | 0.446 |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the post-revolution elite and non-elite households for the children generation (Panel A), parents children (Panel B), and grandparents generation (Panel C). All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. Columns 1 through 4 define migration as an indicator if the current province of residence differs from the province of birth, residence at age 3, residence at age 12, or household registration (*hukou*), respectively. Columns 5 through 7 define migration as an indicator if the current county of residence differs from the county of birth, residence at age 3, residence at age 12 respectively. Sample: children generation (1966–1990 birth cohorts; N = 9,834), parents generation (1940–1965 birth cohorts; N = 10,415), and grandparents generation (pre-1940 birth cohorts; N = 1,390).

**Table A.9:** Migrant selection in terms of education

| | Migration | |
|---|---|---|
| | Individual-level | Household-level |
| | (1) | (2) |
| *Panel A: 2000 Population Census* | | |
| College-educated | 0.067*** | 0.090*** |
| | (0.005) | (0.011) |
| *Panel B: 2005 Population Survey* | | |
| College-educated | 0.103*** | 0.149*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.016) |

Notes: The dependent variables capture individual- (column 1) and household-level migration (column 2); they are dummy-coded. An individual is categorized as a migrant if her county of residence is different from her county of registration. A household is categorized as a migrant household if all its members are registered in a different county from the county of residence. The sample is restricted to agricultural *hukou* holders over 25 and born in or after 1990, and we only consider migrants who migrated after 25 to reduce endogeneity concerns, as these individuals likely have completed their education at the time of migration. In column 2, these sample restrictions apply to the household head. All regressions include (the household head's, in column 2) birth year fixed effects and province of registration fixed effects, and control for sex. Column 2 additionally controls for household size. Panel A uses micro data from a random 1% extract of the 2000 Population Census (sample size: 1,416,510 individuals; 520,938 households). Panel B uses micro data from a 20% extract of the 1% Population Survey of 2005 (sample size: 405,247 individuals; 136,269 households). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.10:** Migrant sorting along wage differentials

| | Migration dummy | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Panel A: income differences | | | | |
| Income difference × elite | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.004 |
| | (0.042) | (0.036) | (0.035) | (0.005) |
| Elite class | -0.013 | -0.010 | -0.013 | -0.003 |
| | (0.016) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.007) |
| Income difference | 0.297*** | 0.416*** | 0.403*** | 0.394*** |
| | (0.075) | (0.062) | (0.063) | (0.027) |
| Panel B: income shocks | | | | |
| Income shock × elite | -0.010 | -0.009 | -0.006 | 0.002 |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.008) | (0.006) |
| Elite class | -0.009 | -0.007 | -0.012 | -0.001 |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.006) |
| Income shock | -0.069** | -0.068** | -0.082*** | -0.243*** |
| | (0.027) | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.041) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Migration from | Born | Age 3 | Age 12 | Hukou |

Notes: All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects; migration is measured at the province level. Panel A: *Income difference* is the wage differential between an individual's province of origin and the typical destination for migrants from her province of origin, i.e., $\sum_d (s_d w_d) - w_o$ where $d$ is a destination, $o$ the origin, $s_d$ the share of emigrants from $o$ who are in $d$, and $w_{o/d}$ is the wage at origin/destination; $s_d$ and $w_{o/d}$ are measured in CFPS. *Income difference* measured in RMB 10,000. Panel B: *Income shock* is the average at the provincial level of Imbert et al.'s (2020) income shocks, which are defined as deviations from international agricultural commodity prices interacted with the local suitability for growing different crops. Columns 1 through 4 define migration as an indicator if the current province of residence differs from the province of birth, residence at age 3, residence at age 12, or household registration (*hukou*), respectively. Sample: children generation (1966–1990 birth cohorts; N = 9,833).

**Table A.11:** Violence during the Land Reform

| | Any report | | | Number of victims | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Death | Struggle | Violence | Death | Struggle |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Pre-Reform landlord share | 0.0013 | -0.0003 | 0.00056 | 0.00005 | 0.00006 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.0024) | (0.00005) | (0.00019) |
| Pre-Reform Gini | -0.009 | -0.070 | -0.020 | 0.0002 | 0.005 |
| | (0.051) | (0.075) | (0.079) | (0.0011) | (0.006) |
| # observations | 639 | 639 | 639 | 639 | 639 |

Notes: The dependent variables capture different types of persecution perpetrated during the Land Reform (death, struggle sessions, and other violence). Each row corresponds to a separate regression. Columns 1–3 regress indicator variables equal to 1 if any persecution of the specified type is reported in the County Gazetteers, and 0 otherwise, on pre-Land Reform measures of land inequality; Columns 4 and 5 use as dependent variables the percentage of victims of the specified persecution type as a share of total population. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.12:** Violence in the 1960s

| | Revolutionary casualties | | Violence victims | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Pre-Reform landlord share | 0.037 | 0.020 | 0.013 | 0.008 |
| | (0.043) | (0.043) | (0.048) | (0.047) |
| Pre-Reform Gini | 0.009 | 0.012 | -0.063 | -0.077 |
| | (0.045) | (0.044) | (0.050) | (0.049) |
| Impute zeros | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| # observations | 519 | 533 | 519 | 533 |

Notes: The dependent variables capture different types of persecutions perpetrated during the Cultural Revolution, using data from Walder and Su (2003). Each row corresponds to a separate regression. Columns 1 and 2 regress dummies equal to 1 if any persecution of the specified type is reported in the County Gazetteers, and 0 otherwise, on pre-Land Reform measures of land inequality; Columns 3 and 4 use as dependent variable the percentage of victims of the specified persecution type as a share of total population. Columns 2 and 4 report the regression coefficients after imputing missing values as zeros. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table A.13:** Reversal of county level inequalities between 1950 and 2000

| | Gini coefficient in 2000 (Amenity-adjusted housing area per capita) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.018** | -0.018** | -0.019* | -0.020* | -0.024* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| # observations | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 411 |
| Control for province FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 2000 night light level | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 1950 education level | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for geographic attributes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for market access | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Regions | All | All | All | All | All | Non-coastal |

Notes: This table reports the relation between the pre-reform land Gini and the 2000 Gini of the amenity-adjusted housing area per capita. All specifications include province fixed effects. The geographical attributes (Columns 4–6) include distances (km) to the shore, fast-speed road network, and major rivers, as well as the means and standard deviations of elevation and slope. Market access (Columns 5 and 6) include both external and internal market access: external (resp., internal) market access is defined as the weighted sum of the populations (from the 1953 Census) in coastal (resp., non-coastal) counties; the weights are the inverse of the exponential of distance, measured in km; coastal counties are defined as counties in provinces with access to the sea. Standard errors accounting for arbitrary spatial correlation (Colella et al., 2019) within a 300-km radius are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: counties with more than 80 households in the random 1% extract of the 2000 Census (N = 572, except in column 6, where N = 411).

**Table A.14:** Reversal of inequality at county level – heterogeneous effects

| | Gini coefficient in 2000 (Amenity-adjusted housing area per capita) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.073* | -0.072* | -0.055 | -0.075* | -0.075* | -0.073* |
| | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.036) | (0.039) | (0.039) | (0.038) |
| × External market access | | -0.005 | | | | |
| | | (0.030) | | | | |
| × Internal market access | | | -0.084*** | | | |
| | | | (0.017) | | | |
| × Distance to 1948 railways | | | | 0.038** | | |
| | | | | (0.017) | | |
| × Distance to Ming courier stations | | | | | 0.040* | |
| | | | | | (0.021) | |
| × Nb. of imperial exam. graduates | | | | | | 0.007 |
| | | | | | | (0.046) |
| # observations | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 |
| Control for province FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 2000 night light level | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 1950 education level | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for geographic attributes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Regions | All | All | All | All | All | All |

Notes: This table analyzes heterogeneity in the relation between the pre-Reform land Gini and 2000 Gini of the amenity-adjusted housing area per capita (both standardized). Regression (1) reproduces the result from Appendix Table A.13, column 5. In each regression (2)-(6), we interact the pre-Land Reform Gini coefficient with one of five dimensions of heterogeneity: (2) external market access, (3) internal market access, (4) distance to railways before the revolutions, measured in 1948, (5) distance to Ming dynasty (1368–1644) courier stations, and (6) total number of imperial examination graduates (*jinshi*) during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), normalized by population in 1953. External (resp., internal) market access is defined as the weighted sum of the populations (from the 1953 Census) in coastal (resp., non-coastal) counties; the weights are the inverse of the exponential of distance, measured in km; coastal counties are defined as counties in provinces with access to the sea. All heterogeneity variables are standardized. All specifications include province fixed effects. Standard errors accounting for arbitrary spatial correlation (Colella et al., 2019) within a 300-km radius are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: counties with more than 80 households in the random 1% extract of the 2000 Census.

**Table A.15:** Historical inequality and contemporary tolerance of inequality

| | Tolerance of inequality | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Pre-revolution Gini | -0.657*** | -0.617*** | -0.620*** |
| | (0.156) | (0.158) | (0.157) |
| DV mean | 3.025 | 3.025 | 3.025 |
| DV std. dev. | 0.974 | 0.974 | 0.974 |
| Cohort FE | No | Yes | Yes |
| Income control | No | No | Yes |

Notes: This table shows the correlation between the county-level Gini coefficients in land ownership prior to the Land Reform and today's preference toward inequality. All regressions include province fixed effects. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: all birth cohorts; number of observations = 4,612.

**Table A.16:** Work ethics of the pre-revolutionary elite

| | Hardwork leads to success | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Panel A:* Grandchildren generation | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 0.078 | 0.077 | 0.079 | 0.073 |
| | (0.098) | (0.098) | (0.098) | (0.098) |
| *Panel B:* 1990-1995 birth cohorts | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 0.124* | 0.131* | 0.126* | 0.124 |
| | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.075) | (0.075) |
| *Panel C:* Grandparents generation | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 0.049 | 0.046 | 0.045 | 0.046 |
| | (0.050) | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.050) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Gender FE | No | Yes | No | No |
| Control family income | No | No | Yes | No |
| Migrants FE | No | No | No | Yes |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households. All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. Column 2 additionally includes gender fixed effects; Column 3 includes control for mean family income; Column 4 includes a migrant indicator variable, defining migrants as individuals whose current county of residence is different from their birth place. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: Panel A, grandchildren generation ($>$ 1995 birth cohorts, number of observations = 942); Panel B, children born between 1990-1995 (number of observations = 1,391); Panel C, grandparents generation (1919-1939 birth cohorts, number of observations = 1,396).

**Table A.17:** Elasticity to shocks

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Panel A:* income elasticity, change in self-reported value | | | | |
| Income difference | 0.022 | 0.030 | -0.063 | 0.024 |
| | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.092) | (0.023) |
| Pre-revolution elite | | -0.030 | -0.059 | -0.025 |
| | | (0.073) | (0.157) | (0.075) |
| Income difference × elite | | -0.046 | -0.033 | -0.042 |
| | | (0.033) | (0.097) | (0.035) |
| N | 3288 | 3288 | 345 | 2584 |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Comparison group | N/A | All | Post-revolution elite | High education |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households for the children generation. The income difference interacted with elite status is the standardized difference in income between 2018 and 2010. The outcome is the change in the standardized valuation of hard work between 2018 and 2010. All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. The sample in columns 1 and 2 is restricted to the children's generation, the sample in column 3 only pre- or post-revolution elites in the children's generation, and the sample in column 4 only above median educated (or pre-revolution elite) in the children's generation. The mean of the dependent variable is -0.742 (std. dev. 0.924). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: 1966–1990 birth cohorts; number of observations = 9,844.

**Table A.18:** Income premium of high work ethics among the non-elite

| | Total annual labor income | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Panel A:* parents with high value for hard work | | | | |
| Parents value hard work | 3588.218*** | 3573.071*** | 3676.092*** | 3642.602*** |
| | (1098.965) | (1087.063) | (1089.116) | (1093.337) |
| *Panel B:* parents with high hours worked | | | | |
| Parents worked long hours | 4324.390*** | 4351.922*** | 4344.609*** | 4364.237*** |
| | (1316.144) | (1298.336) | (1206.878) | (1328.582) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Sector FE | No | Yes | No | No |
| Province×Sector FE | No | No | Yes | No |
| Migrants FE | No | No | No | Yes |

Notes: The sample includes only non pre- or post-revolution elites. The independent variable in Panel A (B) is a dummy for whether one parent is in the top quartile in terms of valuing hard work (hours worked). All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. Column 2 additionally includes sector fixed effects; Column 3 includes province×sector fixed effects; Column 4 includes a migrant indicator variable, defining migrants as individuals whose current county of residence is different from their birth place. The mean of the dependent variable is RMB 11,628 (std. dev. 28,716). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: 1966–1990 birth cohorts; number of observations = 9,844.

**Table A.19:** Co-residence and vertical transmission of values

| | Hard work is critical to success | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | All | Parents alive and co-living | Parents alive and not co-living | Parents not alive |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Pre-revolution elite | 0.076*** | 0.134*** | 0.045 | 0.017 |
| | (0.028) | (0.043) | (0.060) | (0.055) |
| # observations | 9,844 | 2,291 | 3,680 | 3,873 |
| DV mean | 3.911 | 3.924 | 3.891 | 3.922 |
| DV std. dev. | 0.629 | 0.649 | 0.628 | 0.617 |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households for the children generation. Column 1 includes the full sample, column 2 restricts to only the children whose parents are alive and co-living with them, column 3 those whose parents are alive and not co-living with them, and column 4 those whose parents are not alive. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: 1966–1990 birth cohorts; number of observations = 9,844.

**Table A.20:** Decomposing income differences

| | Total annual labor income | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| *Panel A:* children generation of pre-revolution elite | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 1911.524** | 394.003 | 700.184 | 344.451 | 1140.515 | -20.722 |
| | (854.702) | (842.304) | (870.651) | (845.829) | (845.362) | (833.454) |
| *Panel B:* children generation of post-revolution elite | | | | | | |
| Post-revolution elite | 2694.947*** | 2157.084** | 1665.397* | 2046.239** | 1400.984 | 1122.254 |
| | (989.590) | (953.509) | (970.431) | (955.248) | (978.621) | (948.592) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control values | No | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Control social network | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
| Control education | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households for the children generation. All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. The mean of the dependent variable is RMB 11,628 (std. dev. 28,716). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: 1966–1990 birth cohorts; number of observations = 9,844.

**Table A.21:** Decomposing values differences

| | Hard work leads to success | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| *Panel A:* children generation of pre-revolution elite | | | | |
| Pre-revolution elite | 0.127*** | 0.123** | 0.124*** | 0.121** |
| | (0.047) | (0.048) | (0.047) | (0.048) |
| *Panel B:* children generation of post-revolution elite | | | | |
| Post-revolution elite | -0.044 | -0.048 | -0.049 | -0.052 |
| | (0.046) | (0.047) | (0.046) | (0.047) |
| County FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cohort FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control social network | No | Yes | No | Yes |
| Control education | No | No | Yes | Yes |

Notes: The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the elite and non-elite households for the children generation. All specifications include cohort fixed effects and county fixed effects. Outcome variable is the standardized agreement to hard work determining successs. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: 1966–1990 birth cohorts; number of observations = 9,844.

**Table A.22:** Elite and local clan networks — robustness

| | Income | Values | Tightly knit families |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Panel A: Jinshi — children of the pre-revolution elite | | | |
| Clan × elite class | 4303.127 | 0.082 | -0.021 |
| | (3673.932) | (0.081) | (0.047) |
| Elite class | 1956.814 | 0.036 | 0.217*** |
| | (1568.855) | (0.035) | (0.020) |
| Panel B: Jinshi — children of the post-revolution elite | | | |
| Clan × elite class | -3646.010 | -0.069 | -0.022 |
| | (3014.797) | (0.066) | (0.039) |
| Elite class | 2765.004* | -0.044 | 0.185*** |
| | (1457.291) | (0.032) | (0.019) |
| Panel C: NBS — children of the pre-revolution elite | | | |
| Clan × elite class | 22110.037 | 0.141 | 0.145 |
| | (16132.246) | (0.357) | (0.210) |
| Elite class | 566.995 | 0.073** | 0.211*** |
| | (1597.360) | (0.035) | (0.021) |
| Panel D: NBS — children of the post-revolution elite | | | |
| Clan × elite class | -1966.379 | 0.081 | -0.134 |
| | (12587.451) | (0.279) | (0.164) |
| Elite class | 2763.146* | -0.019 | 0.181*** |
| | (1464.237) | (0.032) | (0.019) |
| Mean | 11,628 | 3.911 | 0.233 |
| Std. dev. | 28,715 | 0.629 | 0.423 |

Notes: Clan strength at the prefecture level is a population weighted surname-based HHI (rescaled from 0 to 1) at the county level, with surname data from the highest Imperial examinations during the Qing and Ming dynasties (Panels A and B) or the National Business Survey (Panels C and D). The table presents regression coefficients (standard errors) of estimated differences between members of the pre-revolutionary/post-revolutionary elite and non-elite households for Panels A and B, respectively, controlling for cohort fixed effects and residence county fixed effects. Column 1 has total annual labor income as the outcome, column 2 has the opinion that hard work is critical to success as the outcome, and column 3 has an indicator for co-living parents as the outcome. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: children generations (1966–1990 birth cohorts; N = 9,844).

# Appendix A Historical background

In this section, we provide additional information on the Communist Revolution and the Cultural Revolution. Many books have been written about the historical details of these two revolutions (e.g., MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; Dikötter, 2016); here we focus on the particular aspects of the revolutions that intended to eradicate the advantages of the pre-revolution elite, including confiscating their assets, removing their access to secondary and higher education, and even stigmatizing attitudes and values that they might have held prior to the revolutions.

## A.1 The Communist Revolution and Land Reform

The Communist Revolution was a series of movements that allowed the Chinese Communist Party to consolidate political power throughout China toward the end of the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). The most important of these movements was the Land Reform.[1] We complement Section 2 here by briefly describing the land ownership context prior to the Land Reform, how the Land Reform was implemented, and its effect on land distribution and rural China in general.

First, the context of rural China differed from other settings where land reforms have been implemented or considered. Before the Land Reform, landlords owned 6 times more land (per capita, on average) than poor peasants — see Section 4.1. In other words, while land assets were unequally distributed prior to the Land Reform, the Chinese context does not resemble the extreme land concentration observed in Latin America, characterized by the predominance of large plantations or latifundia — e.g., 92% of cultivated land in Bolivia in 1952 before the land reform (Wagner, 1989). Landlords in China owned a relatively small amount of land, working on the land themselves, and sometimes hiring labor (Fei et al., 1992). Thus, Chinese landlords were closer to well-off farmers in small-scale farming economies than rentiers who own huge plots of land. The rules established by the State Council to distinguish between landlords and rich peasants confirms this specific feature of rural China in the 1940s — see the discussion of class labels below.

Second, the Land Reform was designed to apply to the whole country, while adapting to local circumstances. The Land Reform started in 1947 in the newly "liberated" regions under the Communist Party's rule and concluded in 1953 when the reform reached the entire country. It was formalized and implemented as a nationwide policy by the *Agrarian Reform Law* in late 1950. The law was based on *China's Agrarian Reform Law Framework* approved in 1947 and built upon the Party's earlier land reform experiences. Article 1 of the law, quoted in Section 2, emphasizes the Communist Party's commitment to expropriate the class of landlord and rich peasants and advocate the proprietorship of the peasantry. The rest of the law lays out specific guidelines for transferring land ownership from landlords to poor peasants. Section 2, titled "Confiscation and Requisitioning of Land," orders the landlords' land, cattle, "excessive production tools," and real estate properties to be confiscated (e.g., Article 2). Section 3, "Distribution of Land," further instructs that the confiscated land and other assets should be distributed uniformly, fairly, and reasonably among landless peasants and poor peasants who owned very limited assets (e.g., Article 10).

To guide decision-making and the implementation of the Land Reform across China, the *Agrarian Reform Law* establishes a set of uniform principles. The *Agrarian Reform Law* was nationally ori-

[1] Some of the background description here is also shown in Chen et al. (2017). In this paper, we primarily focus on the rural component of the Communist Revolution, namely, the Land Reform. A parallel movement of wealth confiscation and redistribution was carried out in the urban sector, often named the "Socialist Remold of Capitalist Enterprises."

ented in tone and content, so that more detailed rules and explicit regulations pertaining to implementation needed to be provided in the form of supporting documents, including implementation legislation and important speeches by the central government and provincial authorities. To maximize the chances that implementation would go smoothly and efficiently, the central government devolved all land reform responsibilities to local governments, leaving considerable flexibility to interpret, adapt, plan, and carry out the Land Reform in each locality. This heavy emphasis on the informal and often personalized approach of implementing the Land Reform reflects the reality that the core field staff of the reform — local cadres complemented by the Peasants' Association — were technically under-trained but politically dedicated (Wong, 1973a).

The redistribution process typically consisted of two stages. First, the locality formed *ad hoc* committees and teams, mobilizing the rural masses via propaganda and indoctrination, and crucially, assigning *class labels* to families based on investigations of land holdings and discussions in mass meetings (Hinton, 1966). Second, based on the class labels, land and other production tools were confiscated from the landlords and rich peasants, and redistributed to the landless and poor peasants. The expropriation and redistribution were operationally one process, and in the vast majority of the cases, what was expropriated has been entirely redistributed (Wong, 1973b). Supplemental Figure S.1 presents a photograph taken during the Land Reform when rural residents were measuring the land in preparation for the redistribution.

The Land Reform was a zero-sum game, and the government made sure that the victims complied and the beneficiaries indeed received asset transfers. Both physical and psychological violence (or the threat of violence) were deployed during the confiscation process to suppress opposition from the expropriated households. A militia was organized for the purpose of the Land Reform, and it is estimated that for every landlord there were 8 organized peasants assisting the Land Reform implementation, among whom one was armed (Wong, 1973a). Forced confessions in small groups and mass trials attended by tens of thousands were also employed to induce submission through intense psychological pressure.

Third, the Land Reform achieved a thorough reshuffling of land assets and durably transformed the Chinese countryside. The Land Reform confiscated land from the landlords and rich farmers, and redistributed the land to the poor and landless. While scholars debate on the exact magnitude of land redistribution during the Land Reform, it has undeniably resulted in a "monumental and profound" socioeconomic revolution that affected almost every rural resident in China (Huang, 1995). In 1953, the central government declared that the Land Reform had achieved its goals in most of China. The landlord class was essentially eliminated, and their asset level brought down to that of middle or even poor peasants. Landless, poor, and middle peasants received farmland for cultivation amounting to 43% of total land acreage in China, according to some estimates (among others, see Wong, 1973b; Guillermaz, 1976; Perkins, 2013), which makes the Chinese Land Reform one of the most extreme examples of wealth equalization in a short period of time in human history (Wong, 1973a). The far-reaching social impact of the Land Reform is described by Schurmann (1971) as follows:

> [...] *as a social revolution, land reform succeeded in destroying the traditional system of social stratification in the rural areas. The old rural gentry, whether based on the village or residing in towns, was destroyed. A social element, which had exercised leadership in the village by virtue of its status, its ownership of land, and its access to power had ceased to exist.*

Subsequent policies reinforced the Land Reform by further compressing the land distribution and reducing inequalities. This can be seen by looking at the evolution of property and use rights

over land. During the Land Reform period, effective private ownership over land was still allowed: the new owners held title deeds and had the right to use, purchase, sell, or rent the land as they pleased (Article 30 of the *Agrarian Reform Law*). In 1954, the first Constitution of the People's Republic of China abolished private land ownership. Individual farmers could lease land from the state and grow crops, although no rents were effectively paid to the state. The endowed land that individual farmers could grow food on was essentially land (re)allocated to them during the Land Reform (Lardy, 2008). The collectivization movement that occurred in parallel and accelerated in the mid-1950s gradually introduced restrictions in land use rights. By the end of 1956, all Chinese peasants were affiliated to a cooperative; however, collectivization was not complete. Cooperatives indeed fell into two categories (elementary or semi-socialist cooperatives and advanced or socialist cooperatives) offering different levels of ownership rights, and even in the advanced cooperatives peasants were allowed to retain small plots of land, some tools, and some animals to raise (Guillermaz, 1976). Collectivization was thus complete only during the Great Leap Forward starting in 1958, but as soon as the fall of 1959 rural trade fairs were reopened, and in the summer of 1960 private plots were restored (Perkins, 1966). The last major change to land use rights introduced in China was the household responsibility system, which was first experimented in 1979 and included virtually all Chinese peasants in 1983. Under this system, which still dominates Chinese agriculture today, ownership rights over land remain illegal, but private land use rights were reestablished. Importantly, the land confiscated during the Land Reform was not returned to their previous owners, land allocation is determined based on household demographics at the village level, and transfer rights are limited (Kung, 1995; Vendryes, 2010).

## A.2 Class labels

In order to facilitate asset confiscation and subsequent redistribution during the Communist Revolution, each household was assigned a class label based on what they owned. The specific class labels (in both rural and urban sectors) are listed as follows:

| | **Rural** | **Urban** |
|---|---|---|
| *Non-elite* | Hired labor | Poor peasants in the city |
| | Poor peasants | Workers |
| | Middle peasants | Employees |
| *Elite* | Rich peasants | Enterprise owners |
| | Landlords | Capitalists |

More specifically, to supplement the *Agrarian Reform Law* and to aid the implementation of the Land Reform, the State Council issued a document titled "Decisions on Assigning the Class Labels in the Rural Sector" in 1950. It called local reform committees to divide up all rural residents into the broad classes listed above, and these uniform class labels would act as the basis for redistributive decisions during the Land Reform.

The class label was the only criterion used for asset redistribution. Those who were classified as landlords or rich peasants had their "excessive" assets confiscated, and those classified as middle peasants, poor peasants, and hired labor received asset transfers. Landlords and rich peasants were also the joint target of class-based discrimination until the 1980s (see Bian, 2002, for a review).

We thus group the landlords and rich peasants as the pre-revolution elite (approximately 6% of the population in the rural sector) and the rest as non-elite, according to the asset redistribution (during the Communist Revolution) and discrimination (until after the Cultural Revolution) that they faced. We investigate below alternative definitions of the elite. Our baseline results are robust to considering only the rich peasants, namely the "working" elite without the rentiers.

While the exact cutoffs used to categorize the class labels were often left to the discretion of local Land Reform committees, the State Council issued a document titled "Decisions on Assigning the Class Labels in the Rural Sector" in 1950 to provide general guidelines. For example, regarding household labeling as landlord versus rich peasants, the document stipulated that "in the landlord households, if there were people who regularly worked, and at the same time hired people to work on some of the land, then as long as the land rented out was more than 3 times as large as the land tilled by household members, these households should be classified as landlords rather than rich peasants." Such a rule suggests that landlords working on the land they owned was a common phenomenon in rural China. Importantly, these labels were determined by family asset ownership prior to the reform,[2] and particularly land assets in rural areas: all members of a family shared the same label.

Until the *Agrarian Reform Law* was repealed in 1987, the label was stable over time and through generations, making it a major element of family and personal identity: once a label was assigned it was rarely revised (Unger, 1984), and forging class labels was nearly impossible, for three reasons. First, class labels were common knowledge in villages (Wemheuer, 2019), and the new elite with "good" class backgrounds had little incentive to collude with "bad" elements. Second, a double record of class labels was kept: one in individual dossiers, which in rural areas were held by the collective (4,000–5,000 households on average), and another, separate record held by central security organs for Party cadres (Cheng and Selden, 1994; Wemheuer, 2019); both records were inaccessible to the individuals concerned. Third, class background was subject to potential rechecks by external teams during political campaigns (Brown, 2015), and "providing false or misleading information could lead to serious consequences if, for example, a "landlord who had escaped the net" was uncovered" (Wemheuer, 2019). While the initial assignment of the class labels signaled the regime's judgment about the "inherent loyalties of families" (Walder and Hu, 2009), class labels were preserved along patriarchal lines regardless of the actual political inclination and behavior of individuals. Moreover, each citizen was required to know her own class label. The elicitation of class labels thus allows researchers to trace family lineages, in particular the broad level of household assets prior to the revolutions. We describe in greater detail the elicitation of class labels in our data in Section 3.

The motivation behind class labels was to identify and therefore discriminate against the former elite and eliminate any educational or income advantage they might retain over the masses, consistent with the overarching goal of the Communist Revolution and the subsequent Cultural Revolution. Class labels determined in particular the likelihood of admission to high school and college, job assignments, promotions, and access to Party membership (Kraus, 1981; Unger, 1982; Lee, 1991). One unintended consequence of the system was, however, to remind people of who their parents and grandparents were, perhaps making family history and identity more salient.

[2]Contrary to later political campaigns, no quotas were set during the Land Reform — e.g., in terms of a number or share of landlord labels (Kung et al., 2012). Local leaders may have however felt pressure to identify at least some "targets for class struggle" (Friedman et al., 1991).

## A.3 The Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution is a massive sociopolitical movement launched by Mao Zedong in 1966, intended to preserve the fruits of the Communist Revolution. While it began as a purge of "disloyal" Communist Party officials, its scope quickly widened to target all elite groups and authority figures, leading to a decade long of chaos and violence until Mao's death in 1976. We focus here on two main aspects of the Cultural Revolution: its stance toward the pre-revolution elite, and its disruptive education policy.[3] In this section, we complement Section 2 by *(i)* providing more details about the motivation behind the Cultural Revolution, *(ii)* comparing discrimination against the pre-revolution elite in their access to higher education during the Cultural Revolution with the rest of the Mao era, and *(iii)* describing briefly the Cultural Revolution's onslaught on pre-Communist culture and beliefs.

First, discrimination against the pre-revolution elite was a key component of the Cultural Revolution. Since its inception, the Cultural Revolution was concerned with status inheritance. One of its primary goals was to prevent the pre-revolution or emerging elite from passing down their privileges to their offspring (Whyte, 1973; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Andreas, 2009) and thus "destratify" Chinese society (Parish, 1984). The initial motivation was to prevent the entrenchment of a bureaucratic elite, whom Mao viewed as a threat to the revolution. He feared that they became "a 'privileged stratum' and take the capitalist road, as allegedly [had] happened in the Soviet Union" (Bernstein, 1977). The scope of the Cultural Revolution quickly widened to encompass all high-status groups. Pre-revolution elite households often managed to secure elite professional occupations in the Communist regime (Rosen, 1982; Unger, 1982; Andreas, 2002; Walder and Hu, 2009). This fact, combined with the view that individuals with a "bad" class background — namely those with elite class labels — were inherently "revisionist," or hostile to the revolution, justified in the eyes of Mao further discrimination and violence during the Cultural Revolution. In an interview given in 1965 to the French Minister of Cultural Affairs, André Malraux, Chairman Mao claimed that there was a broad "revisionist layer" in China, "large not in numbers but in the influence it exerts. This layer is made up of the former landlords, former rich peasants, former capitalists [...], and part of their children" (Andrieu, 1996). The goal then was to completely eliminate any remaining advantage of the pre-revolution elite and their descendants over the masses.[4]

The risk that the elite maintain their influence through education lies behind the radical and disruptive educational policy initiated during the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006). The revolution severely disrupted higher education in two main ways. First, almost all high schools and colleges were shut down between 1966 and 1968, and most universities remained closed until 1972 (Bernstein, 1977; Unger, 1982). Supplemental Figure S.2 presents a photograph of students at Peking University, one of the best universities in China, during the Cultural Revolution, where students gathered to chant revolutionary slogans. Second, merit-based admission into higher education was suspended throughout the Cultural Revolution. When universities reopened in 1972, admission was primarily based on class labels (at the expense of the pre-revolution

[3]The mass mobilization at the core of the Cultural Revolution led to large-scale disorganization. Before the imposition of martial law, the Cultural Revolution caused in less than two years a complete collapse of the state apparatus and severely disrupted production. Industry value added dropped from 44.6 to 12.6 million Chinese yuan (in constant 1990 prices) between 1966 and 1967, and it would not recover until 1980 (Dong and Wu, 2004).

[4]Recent research suggests that all of Chinese society was affected by the Cultural Revolution. While an earlier scholarly consensus regarded it as a mostly urban phenomenon (Baum, 1971), contributions since Walder and Su (2003) have investigated post-Mao sources, including sections in the gazetteers we use in this paper, and suggest an extensive rural impact.

elite, of course) and political achievements rather than academic credentials (Shirk, 1982). The only eligible applicants were workers, peasants, and soldiers, except for small quotas (below 5%) established for the "educable children [of class enemies]" (Deng and Treiman, 1997). Such a discrimination against the descendants of landlords and rich peasants remained until a meritocratic university entrance exam was reestablished in 1977 (see Chen, 2007; Roland and Yang, 2017, for more details about the resumption of the *gaokao*).

Second, discrimination against the descendants of the pre-revolution elite was the most extreme during the Cultural Revolution, but it characterizes the whole period between the Communist Revolution and the end of the Cultural Revolution. From the outset, the Chinese Communist Party oscillated between promoting mass education and a meritocratic elite with the technical skills and expertise necessary for economic development (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Andreas, 2009; Chen et al., 2015). In some years, admission into higher education was granted by "recommendation only," and priority was given to workers, peasants, and children of "revolutionary cadres and martyrs" (Deng and Treiman, 1997). In other periods, the national college recruitment examination was re-established. Applicants with an undesirable class background were, however, systematically discriminated against (policy of "priorities among equivalents").

Third, besides disrupting education, the Cultural Revolution induced a wide range of disturbances across Chinese society. The inheritance of culture and values from the pre-Communist era was regarded with suspicion: teachers became the targets of "struggle sessions," which included public humiliations, beatings, and torture (Wang, 2001). Children were also often encouraged to expose their parents' counter-revolutionary behaviors, representing a broad effort to weaken the nuclear family structure. An entire generation of urban students was sent to the countryside for political reeducation through manual work and contact with the masses (the "Sent-Down Movement"). Zhou (2004) shows that the probability of being sent down increased with the father's educational attainment. The separation of children and parents during formative years of their lives could have significant implications on the vertical transmission of cultural values. However, this is less of a concern for our study as we focus on rural households, none of which sent away children during the Cultural Revolution since there were already residing in the countryside.

# Appendix B Additional details on data sources

## B.1 *County Gazetteers*: calculating county Gini coefficients in land ownership

We now describe how we calculate the county-level Gini coefficients in land ownership based on the *County Gazetteers* data.

We assume that land ownership among households within each of the five social classes is homogeneous. We assume that land ownership for landless hired peasants is zero if the value is missing. Some counties also list other special classes, for example, small land renters and half-landlord rich peasants; the land owned by these special classes, government, and other organizations is not included.

We define the county-level Gini as 1 minus twice the area under the (discrete) cumulative distribution function of land ownership. Supplemental Figure S.3 illustrates the construction of the Gini coefficients, where we normalize total population and total land ownership to 1 and plot the cumulative land ownership for each social class.

Given that land ownership statistics are only available in aggregate (by category), we make the following adjustment to re-scale the Gini coefficient to [0,1]. We define adjusted-Gini = 1 as the unequal world where landlords own all land, and adjusted-Gini = 0 as the equal world where everybody holds the same land share. Specifically, we re-scale the Gini as follows:

$$Gini = \frac{maxCDF - CDF(Land)}{maxCDF - minCDF}$$

where $CDF(Land) = \sum_{Class}(Pop_{Class} \times CumulativeLand_{Class})$ is the cumulative density function of land ownership; $maxCDF$ is the maximum value of CDF (i.e., extreme equality) under discrete distribution of population sub-groups, where everyone owns the same share of land in the society; and $minCDF$ is the minimum value of CDF (i.e., extreme inequality) under discrete distribution, where all land is owned by landlords. The numerator ensures that the Gini coefficients are bounded below by 0, and the denominator scales the Gini coefficients so they are between 0 and 1.

We perform a number of robustness exercises using alternative measurements of county-level inequality: *(i)* using the raw Gini coefficients, without adjusting for the discrete nature of the distribution; *(ii)* using Gini coefficients with and without adjustment based on the amenity of the housing; and *(iii)* using Theil index to measure inequality. We show that the adjusted Gini is basically a linear transformation of the raw Gini *ad hoc*; the correlation is as high as 98.8% (see Supplemental Figure S.4). Moreover, the Gini coefficients with and without amenity adjustment are 95.3% correlated, and the adjusted Gini is also 91.9% correlated with the Theil index (see Supplemental Table S.1).

## B.2 *County Gazetteers*: sample selection

In Section 3.1, we introduce our measure of land ownership distribution based on the *County Gazetteers*. Here, we first describe the methodology we followed to collect the *County Gazetteers*; second, we discuss sample selection by comparing counties along the degree of completeness of the information available on land distribution prior to the Land Reform; and third, we assess selection by comparing the data with a distinct source of information, the *Province Gazetteers*.

First, our data collection effort goes through the following steps to maximize coverage and

ensure that the *County Gazetteers* data can be matched with contemporary counties. We start with all areas named "counties" in the 2000 administrative records. This ensures that all counties can be readily matched to contemporary census data. Next, we expand our efforts to areas named "cities" and add the data to our sample if the pre-Land Reform ownership distribution is available in the *County Gazetteers*. We regard the two as the same if they are documented under the same historical narratives in the most comprehensive Chinese online encyclopedia, Baidu Baike. Urban districts without documentation about the Land Reform are excluded. Note also that we exclude Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia due to different land policies designed for minority groups. Overall, we identify 639 counties in the gazetteers with the pre-Land Reform land distribution data necessary to calculate within-county inequality.

Second, as some *County Gazetteers* contain no or incomplete information on the land distribution prior to the Land Reform, sample selection may affect our findings. To assess this issue, we begin by comparing counties that differ in terms of the availability of the data we need to compute measures of inequality. Appendix Table A.2, Panel A, presents summary statistics for counties in the sample along the following dimensions: geographical characteristics (distance to the coast, longitude, latitude), economic development (contemporary GDP per capita, average nighttime luminosity, average and median years of education, average educational attainment for cohorts born before 1950),[5], average contemporary housing area (adjusted for housing amenities and non-adjusted), and contemporary housing Gini coefficient.

Panel B presents the p-values from three balance t-tests to check for potential sample selection based on observable features: between the counties with complete data and those with either incomplete or no data, between the counties with complete and incomplete data, and between the counties with at least some data and those without any data. Among all the 11 variables that we examine, counties with complete historical land ownership data differ from other counties only along median contemporary housing area (both raw and amenity-adjusted) and the average nighttime luminosity. Importantly, contemporary housing inequality is *not* associated with the availability of complete archival records on land ownership inequality prior to the Land Reform.

Third, to further assess the importance of selection in the *County Gazetteer* data, we compare them with data from a separate source. We collect data from the *Province Gazetteers* on land ownership by social classes, both before and after the Land Reform, as well as the number of counties that the provincial averages are based on. Although province and county gazetteers should draw on the same primary data, the average shares computed from these two sources differ, as they cover different subsets of counties. This allows us to assess the representativeness of the *County Gazetteer* data used in this paper.

We compute average land shares at the province level based on the province and county gazetteers, and plot them against each other, as shown in Appendix Figure A.3. Each dot corresponds to one province-period-class, e.g., it shows the average land share of poor peasants just before the Land Reform in Zhejiang province; we can match 64 such statistics at the province-period-class level. We see from Panel A that there is some variation, but most observations fall on or near the 45-degree line. We can further weight each observation by the number of counties used to compute the average share in the province gazetteer, which we do in Panel B. When a *Province Gazetteer* does not specify the number of counties used in the computation, we assume it is the same as the number of available *County Gazetteers*. This suggests that outliers are mostly due to provincial averages based on few county-level statistics.

[5]Nighttime luminosity as a proxy for regional development level has been widely used: see Alesina et al. (2016) as a recent example and Donaldson and Storeygard (2016) for a review.

Supplemental Table S.2 provides similar evidence in regression format. Column 1 regresses the provincial averages from the *Province Gazetteers* on the provincial averages from the *County Gazetteers*; Column 2 introduces the same weights as in Appendix Figure A.3; and Columns 3, 4, and 5 introduce province, class, and period fixed effects, respectively. In all five specifications, the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from 1 at conventional confidence levels and quite precisely estimated. The similarity between these two separate data sources suggests that the data collected from the *County Gazetteers*, while unable to cover the entire country, are unlikely to suffer from severe distortions due to sample selection.

### B.3 2000 Population Census: migration

In Section 3.3, we introduce the 1% micro sample of the 2000 Population Census as a data source to measure the contemporary wealth distribution at the county level. Summary statistics are presented in Supplemental Table S.3.

We focus on the year 2000 because it is the last census wave before mass rural to urban migration began in China. Although migration is an important factor in how local inequality evolves, pre-migration measures of local inequality ensure that the pattern of persistence (or lack thereof) in regional wealth inequality is not driven by selective migration across localities.[6] Three migration episodes may drive regional wealth inequality patterns. First, we cannot rule out that emigration at the onset of the Communist and Cultural Revolutions was affected by the pre-revolution land ownership distribution. Emigration was however a marginal phenomenon. The main destinations in the aftermath of the Civil War were Taiwan, with 1.2 million immigrants from mainland China by 1956 (Lin, 2018; Yap, 2018), and Hong Kong, with 385,000 by 1954 (Peterson, 2012). While large, these numbers accounted but for a small share of the Chinese population. Even if we assume all came from rural areas, these emigrants would account for less than 0.1% of the total rural population in China in 1950. Even if they were all landlords, they would account for less than 1% of the landlord population. Second, migration was relatively unfettered in the 1950s up until the Great Famine. While contemporaneous census data (censuses were carried out in 1953 and 1964) do not include sufficient information to study migration, we can estimate the incidence of migration using data on the birthplace of the grandparents and parents generations using the CFPS and 2000 Census data. CFPS results are displayed in Appendix Table A.8 and show that *(i)* migration (especially between counties of the same province) is not trivial in the children and grandparents generations, but quite marginal on average in the parents generation, *(ii)* across all three generations and regardless of the way we define migration (relative to the birthplace, the place of residence at age 3, the place of residence at 12, and the place of household registration or *hukou*, as well as between provinces or between counties) pre-revolution elite and non-elite households do not differ in their members' propensity to migrate, and *(iii)* if anything their members are *less* likely to migrate (this is significant in some cases, e.g., inter-county migration in the children generation). The 2000 Census data allow us to shed more light on *(i)* before the mass migration that occurred between 2000 and 2010, when CFPS was carried out: in each of the three generations, the average migration rate in 2000 (defining migration as living in a county different from one's county of registration) lay below 5%. Third, some rural to urban migration did occur between the introduction of economic reforms in the late 1970s and 2000. We can however show that rural emigration was still a marginal phenomenon in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990 Population Census,

[6] We assess the role of selective migration and remittances in explaining the pre-revolution elite's rebound in Section 5.1.

2.21% of agricultural *hukou* holders were living outside their places of registration. Migrants who changed their place of registration are not captured by this measure; this was however extremely rare at the time.[7]

We further use the 2000 Census in the paper to distinguish between individual- and household-level migration, the latter phenomenon being entirely missed by CFPS if migrants cross county boundaries. In 2000, 3.76% of agricultural *hukou* holders were living outside their counties of registration, while migration of all household members concerned 4.85% of agricultural *hukou* households and 2.80% of agricultural *hukou* holders.[8]

### B.4 2000 Population Census: contemporary wealth distribution at the county level

In order to measure contemporary wealth distribution at the county level, we use a random 1% micro sample of the 2000 Population Census.

We use the residential housing area per capita of the household to construct a contemporary inequality measure at the county level. We rely on residential housing area to measure real estate property inequality, because this figure is reported for everyone in the population (both home owners and renters), and it is much less likely to suffer from self-reporting bias than savings and income. Moreover, as long as the same biases exist for all counties, our comparison of the relative differences in inequality across counties is still valid. An important caveat of inequality measures based on housing size is that as rural areas become more urbanized, the upper tail of the population could begin to reside in apartments that are of smaller size but higher value than rural houses. This would underestimate the contemporary local inequality, particularly in more urbanized counties. In Section 5, we take into account the urbanization rate and demonstrate that the results we document are unlikely to be driven by urbanization.

Similar to the land-based Gini coefficients in the 1950s, we construct Gini coefficients based on housing size as one minus twice the area under the cumulative distribution function of the housing size. Specifically, we sort all individuals $i$ by their housing size per capita, compute the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of housing size ownership for each county $j$, and define the integral of the CDF as the modern housing Gini coefficient as follows:

$$Gini_j(Housing) = 1 - 2\int_{i \in j} CumulativeHousing_i$$

To capture quality differences in real estate, we adjust living size based on reported housing amenities. Specifically, we inflate the living size by 10% for each of the following modern residential characteristics: building has more than one floor, independent kitchen, equipped with gas or electric stove, in-unit tap water available, equipped with hot bath water, or equipped with in-unit bathrooms. The amenity adjustment would take into account structural factors that make smaller living areas more valuable than larger ones (e.g., apartments versus rural houses). Our results are robust to using either amenity adjusted or non-adjusted living size as the basis of the inequality measure, and to adjusting the housing area either for all factors equally or following PCA loadings for the six different factors (see Supplemental Table S.5).

[7] Note that the 1990 Census incorporates intra-county mobility, while the 2000 Census does allow us to isolate inter-county movements. Note also that the definition of migrants differs in the two censuses: in 1990, only migrants absent from their places of registration for more than one year were counted; in 2000, the cutoff was reduced to six months.

[8] A household is categorized as agricultural if all its members hold an agricultural *hukou*; it is categorized as a migrant household if all its members are registered in a different county from the county of residence.

# Appendix C Inequality decades prior to the revolutions

The main analysis that we present in the paper takes land inequality in the late 1940s, just before the Land Reform, as the starting point. To gauge whether land inequality on the eve of the Land Reform reflects the medium-run distribution of land in rural China, we complement our baseline analysis with a data source on land distribution that is independent from the *County Gazetteers*. Specifically, we measure the land ownership distribution in the 1930s, the earliest period for which data on land distribution across Chinese counties exist. The source is *Land Utilization in China: A Study of 16,786 Farmers in 168 Localities, and 38,256 Farm Families in Twenty Two Provinces in China, 1929–1933*, compiled by John L. Buck in 1937. Buck, the head of the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Nanking, sent his students to different villages across China to survey land utilization. We aggregate these reports from villages to the county level, which covers 142 counties. The counties are not representative of China, but these reports are the most comprehensive data available on China's agricultural sector prior to 1949.

We first examine whether the land distribution in the 1930s is predictive of that in the late 1940s just before the Land Reform. Overall, 50 counties can be matched to the pre-Land Reform Gazetteer data. As shown in Appendix Table A.1, Panel A, the share of land area owned by landlords in the 1930s is positively, significantly, and robustly correlated with the corresponding measures in the late 1940s. In other words, the land distribution on the eve of the Land Reform reflects an agricultural landscape in China that had prevailed for at least several decades, and potentially for even longer periods.

We then examine whether the pattern of reversal in county-level land inequality in 2000 is robust to focusing on a longer time horizon — from the 1930s to 2000. We match 138 counties in the 1930s reports to the 2000 Census. In Appendix Table A.1, Panel B, we predict real estate inequality in 2000 with share of land area owned by landlords in the 1930s. This share is negatively (albeit not significantly) correlated with housing inequality measured in 2000. This, again, suggests that the Land Reform and Communist Revolution is a shock to China's land distribution, which has been otherwise fairly slow-moving.

# Appendix D Measures of intergenerational mobility: transition matrix

## D.1 Theoretical derivation: the correspondence from transition matrix to regression coefficients

For a transitional matrix,

| | Young Top X | Young Bottom 1-X |
|---|---|---|
| Old Top X | $a$ | $b$ |
| Old Bottom 1-X | $c$ | $d$ |

We solve $b, c, d$ as functions of $a$ and $X$ first.

$$b = 1 - a$$

$$c = \frac{(1-a)X}{1-X}$$

$$d = 1 - \frac{(1-a)X}{1-X}$$

Consider the following two regressions linking the rank of the young generation to the social status of the old generation. Regression 1: Regress the dummy of being in the top $X$ of the young generation on the dummy of being in the top $X$ of the old generation.

$$D_{young}(Top\ X) = \beta_1 D_{old}(Top\ X) + c + \epsilon$$

The coefficient is the expectation of probability difference of entering in the top $X$ rank.

$$\beta_1 = a - \frac{X}{1-X}(1-a) = \frac{a-X}{1-X}$$

Regression 2: Regress the rank of young generation on the dummy of being in the top X of the old generation.

$$Rank_{young}(TopX) = \beta_2 D_{old}(TopX) + c + \epsilon$$

The coefficient $\beta_2$ is the expectation of rank difference. The cohort from top $X$ of the old generation:$a(1 - \frac{X}{2}) + (1-a)\frac{1-X}{2} = \frac{1+a-X}{2}$. The cohort from the bottom $1-X$: $\frac{(1-a)X}{1-X} \times (1 - \frac{X}{2}) + (1 - \frac{(1-a)X}{1-X})\frac{1-X}{2} = \frac{1-X+\frac{X(1-a)}{1-X}}{2}$. The coefficient

$$\beta_2 = \frac{a - \frac{X(1-a)}{1-X}}{2} = \frac{a-X}{2(1-X)}$$

## D.2 Empirical implementation

We try to compare our individual-level persistence with the US and Canada. We compute the three-generation decile by decile transition matrix in the US and Canada. There is no data capturing the persistence from grandparents to grandchildren. Thus, we compute the three-generation transition matrix from the parent-child transition matrix.

In the US, we compute the decile by decile parent-child matrix based on the $100 \times 100$ matrix

provided by Chetty et al. (2014).[9] Corak and Heisz (1998) report the decile by decile transition matrix with Canadian income tax data. Additionally, we manually compute the decile by decile parent-child matrix using family panel data from Taiwan (Yu, 2019) and Russia (Popkin, 2016).

We further assume that the transmission are independent from generation to generation. Thus, the three-generation matrix $M_3$ would be simply the squared parent-child matrix $M_2$:

$$M_3 = M_2^2$$

We reproduce below the three-generation transmission matrix in the US, estimated by Chetty et al. (2014):

| | *Dec*.1 | *Dec*.2 | *Dec*.3 | *Dec*.4 | *Dec*.5 | *Dec*.6 | *Dec*.7 | *Dec*.8 | *Dec*.9 | *Dec*.10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Dec*.1 | 0.1406 | 0.1191 | 0.111 | 0.1055 | 0.0988 | 0.0923 | 0.0871 | 0.0821 | 0.0818 | 0.0815 |
| *Dec*.2 | 0.1264 | 0.1149 | 0.1095 | 0.1054 | 0.1006 | 0.0955 | 0.0911 | 0.0863 | 0.0856 | 0.0847 |
| *Dec*.3 | 0.1172 | 0.1112 | 0.1076 | 0.1047 | 0.1013 | 0.0974 | 0.0938 | 0.0898 | 0.0891 | 0.0880 |
| *Dec*.4 | 0.1094 | 0.1074 | 0.1054 | 0.1036 | 0.1015 | 0.0990 | 0.0964 | 0.0932 | 0.0926 | 0.0916 |
| *Dec*.5 | 0.1022 | 0.1034 | 0.1029 | 0.1022 | 0.1014 | 0.1002 | 0.0988 | 0.0969 | 0.0964 | 0.0956 |
| *Dec*.6 | 0.0953 | 0.0991 | 0.1001 | 0.1005 | 0.1010 | 0.1013 | 0.1012 | 0.1008 | 0.1006 | 0.1001 |
| *Dec*.7 | 0.0882 | 0.0943 | 0.0968 | 0.0985 | 0.1004 | 0.1023 | 0.1038 | 0.1051 | 0.1052 | 0.1053 |
| *Dec*.8 | 0.0806 | 0.0890 | 0.0930 | 0.0961 | 0.0996 | 0.1033 | 0.1066 | 0.1100 | 0.1105 | 0.1111 |
| *Dec*.9 | 0.0738 | 0.0839 | 0.0893 | 0.0936 | 0.0986 | 0.1041 | 0.1092 | 0.1148 | 0.1157 | 0.1169 |
| *Dec*.10 | 0.0663 | 0.0776 | 0.0843 | 0.0900 | 0.0967 | 0.1044 | 0.1120 | 0.1209 | 0.1226 | 0.1252 |

We reproduce below the three-generation transmission matrix in Canada, estimated by Corak and Heisz (1998):

| | *Dec*.1 | *Dec*.2 | *Dec*.3 | *Dec*.4 | *Dec*.5 | *Dec*.6 | *Dec*.7 | *Dec*.8 | *Dec*.9 | *Dec*.10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Dec*.1 | 0.1117 | 0.1059 | 0.1031 | 0.1003 | 0.0989 | 0.0972 | 0.0963 | 0.0963 | 0.0964 | 0.0967 |
| *Dec*.2 | 0.1083 | 0.1045 | 0.1025 | 0.1004 | 0.0994 | 0.0979 | 0.0971 | 0.0970 | 0.0968 | 0.0968 |
| *Dec*.3 | 0.1055 | 0.1035 | 0.1023 | 0.1008 | 0.1000 | 0.0986 | 0.098 | 0.0978 | 0.0973 | 0.0970 |
| *Dec*.4 | 0.1032 | 0.1023 | 0.1017 | 0.1009 | 0.1004 | 0.0995 | 0.0991 | 0.0989 | 0.0985 | 0.0982 |
| *Dec*.5 | 0.1007 | 0.1009 | 0.1009 | 0.1006 | 0.1004 | 0.0998 | 0.0995 | 0.0994 | 0.0988 | 0.0985 |
| *Dec*.6 | 0.0988 | 0.0999 | 0.1004 | 0.1006 | 0.1008 | 0.1006 | 0.1005 | 0.1004 | 0.0999 | 0.0998 |
| *Dec*.7 | 0.0960 | 0.0983 | 0.0995 | 0.1005 | 0.1011 | 0.1013 | 0.1016 | 0.1015 | 0.1011 | 0.1009 |
| *Dec*.8 | 0.0939 | 0.0967 | 0.0985 | 0.1001 | 0.1011 | 0.1018 | 0.1024 | 0.1025 | 0.1023 | 0.1024 |
| *Dec*.9 | 0.0911 | 0.0945 | 0.0967 | 0.0991 | 0.1006 | 0.1021 | 0.1034 | 0.1036 | 0.1041 | 0.1045 |
| *Dec*.10 | 0.0916 | 0.0941 | 0.096 | 0.0984 | 0.1001 | 0.102 | 0.1038 | 0.1042 | 0.1056 | 0.1069 |

We reproduce below the three-generation transmission matrix in Taiwan, with data sourced from Yu (2019):

[9] The 100 by 100 transition matrix can be downloaded from the data library of Opportunity Insights. See: *https://opportunityinsights.org/data/*

| | *Dec*.1 | *Dec*.2 | *Dec*.3 | *Dec*.4 | *Dec*.5 | *Dec*.6 | *Dec*.7 | *Dec*.8 | *Dec*.9 | *Dec*.10 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Dec*.1 | 0.1056 | 0.0979 | 0.1016 | 0.1301 | 0.0671 | 0.0967 | 0.1174 | 0.0872 | 0.1018 | 0.0946 |
| *Dec*.2 | 0.1056 | 0.0979 | 0.1016 | 0.1301 | 0.0671 | 0.0967 | 0.1174 | 0.0872 | 0.1018 | 0.0946 |
| *Dec*.3 | 0.1003 | 0.0961 | 0.1030 | 0.1295 | 0.0721 | 0.0973 | 0.1167 | 0.0881 | 0.1012 | 0.0957 |
| *Dec*.4 | 0.0993 | 0.0981 | 0.1000 | 0.1314 | 0.0681 | 0.0982 | 0.1124 | 0.0904 | 0.1056 | 0.0964 |
| *Dec*.5 | 0.1037 | 0.0963 | 0.1038 | 0.1283 | 0.0681 | 0.0995 | 0.1116 | 0.0869 | 0.1054 | 0.0963 |
| *Dec*.6 | 0.1048 | 0.0944 | 0.1042 | 0.1275 | 0.0731 | 0.0982 | 0.1164 | 0.0851 | 0.0991 | 0.0972 |
| *Dec*.7 | 0.0940 | 0.0973 | 0.1014 | 0.1335 | 0.0768 | 0.0981 | 0.1185 | 0.0898 | 0.0975 | 0.0931 |
| *Dec*.8 | 0.0996 | 0.0960 | 0.1018 | 0.1313 | 0.0748 | 0.0963 | 0.1184 | 0.0876 | 0.0994 | 0.0948 |
| *Dec*.9 | 0.0981 | 0.0992 | 0.0988 | 0.1310 | 0.0698 | 0.0988 | 0.1120 | 0.0916 | 0.1035 | 0.0972 |
| *Dec*.10 | 0.1077 | 0.0893 | 0.1046 | 0.1191 | 0.0731 | 0.0922 | 0.1144 | 0.0857 | 0.1111 | 0.1026 |

We reproduce below the three-generation transmission matrix in Russia, with data sourced from Popkin (2016):

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Dec*.1 | 0.1253 | 0.1127 | 0.1311 | 0.1161 | 0.0877 | 0.0982 | 0.0947 | 0.1000 | 0.0508 | 0.0835 |
| *Dec*.2 | 0.1207 | 0.0983 | 0.1244 | 0.1158 | 0.0888 | 0.1043 | 0.0992 | 0.1072 | 0.0568 | 0.0844 |
| *Dec*.3 | 0.1205 | 0.0952 | 0.1177 | 0.1132 | 0.0874 | 0.1063 | 0.0986 | 0.1089 | 0.0614 | 0.0909 |
| *Dec*.4 | 0.1162 | 0.0840 | 0.1093 | 0.1057 | 0.0842 | 0.1078 | 0.0984 | 0.1170 | 0.0712 | 0.1063 |
| *Dec*.5 | 0.1149 | 0.0813 | 0.1075 | 0.1060 | 0.0853 | 0.1102 | 0.0994 | 0.1199 | 0.0720 | 0.1036 |
| *Dec*.6 | 0.1165 | 0.0837 | 0.1123 | 0.1080 | 0.0853 | 0.1083 | 0.1004 | 0.1173 | 0.0677 | 0.1004 |
| *Dec*.7 | 0.1154 | 0.0800 | 0.1027 | 0.1015 | 0.0808 | 0.1083 | 0.0984 | 0.1235 | 0.0745 | 0.1149 |
| *Dec*.8 | 0.1143 | 0.0757 | 0.1046 | 0.1026 | 0.0833 | 0.1113 | 0.1003 | 0.1242 | 0.0749 | 0.1088 |
| *Dec*.9 | 0.1132 | 0.0779 | 0.0987 | 0.0991 | 0.0795 | 0.1114 | 0.0962 | 0.1240 | 0.0809 | 0.1190 |
| *Dec*.10 | 0.1173 | 0.0680 | 0.0841 | 0.0781 | 0.0719 | 0.1055 | 0.0939 | 0.1331 | 0.0927 | 0.1554 |

In the context of rural China and the pre-revolution elite, $X = 10\%$, $a_{Canada,X=10\%} = 0.1117$, $a_{US,X=10\%} = 0.1406$, $a_{Taiwan,X=10\%} = 0.1012$, and $a_{Russia,X=10\%} = 0.1554$. In the US data, we also compute $X = 5\%$, and $a_{US,X=5\%} = 0.0810$.

$$\beta_{1,Canada,X=10\%} = \frac{0.01117}{0.9} = 0.0124$$

$$\beta_{2,Canada,X=10\%} = \frac{0.01117}{1.8} = 0.0062$$

$$\beta_{1,US,X=10\%} = \frac{0.01406}{0.9} = 0.0156$$

$$\beta_{2,US,X=10\%} = \frac{0.01406}{1.8} = 0.0078$$

$$\beta_{1,US,X=5\%} = \frac{0.0810}{0.95} = 0.0853$$

$$\beta_{2,US,X=5\%} = \frac{0.0117}{1.9} = 0.0426$$

$$\beta_{1,Taiwan,X=10\%} = \frac{0.0026}{0.9} = 0.0029$$

$$\beta_{2,Taiwan,X=10\%} = \frac{0.0026}{1.8} = 0.0014$$

$$\beta_{1,Russia,X=10\%} = \frac{0.0554}{0.9} = 0.0616$$

$$\beta_{2,Russia,X=10\%} = \frac{0.012}{1.8} = 0.0308$$

## Appendix E Reversal in county level inequality

In Section 5.1, we discuss whether the pre-revolution elite's rebound reflects the growing local inequality. In order to examine the persistence (or lack thereof) in inequality at the aggregate level, we ask whether contemporary inequality (proxied by inequality in housing size) in a given county is associated with land ownership inequality prior to the Communist Revolution. We provide a more detailed discussion of the results in this Appendix section.

Figure 1, Panel C, maps the real estate housing Gini coefficients in 2000 across counties. Relative to the land ownership inequality just after the Land Reform (Panel B), inequality had begun to re-emerge throughout China by 2000. Moreover, regions that were more unequal prior to the Land Reform (Panel A), such as the northeastern provinces, became relatively more equal in 2000; we can also note that inequality seems less spatially correlated in 2000, which may be partly due to the removal of historical determinants of land inequality prior to the Land Reform.

In Appendix Table A.13, we regress the real estate housing Gini coefficients in 2000 at the county level on the corresponding land ownership Gini coefficients just prior to the Land Reform. We include province fixed effects throughout. We exclude counties with less than 80 households[10] in the random 1% extract of the 2000 Census to reduce measurement error in within-county inequality, restricting the sample to 572 counties; we carry out extensive robustness checks to show that our results are not sensitive to this cutoff. Column 1 presents the baseline coefficient estimates. We observe a strong and sizable *negative* relationship between the pre-Land Reform inequality and contemporary inequality (measured in 2000). In other words, the Land Reform and Cultural Revolution were successful in the long run at the county level: past inequalities were not only suppressed; the Land Reform reversed the pattern across China and made historically more unequal places relatively more equal today. Note that since this analysis is conducted at the county level, the reversal we document does not suggest that counties more unequal prior to the Land Reform become more equal in 2000 in *absolute* terms, but rather, they become more equal *relative* to other counties.

This reversal pattern is robust to taking into account of a variety of factors that could affect inequality. In fact, time invariant factors that would be associated with inequality within county (e.g., geographic or structural reasons that make a county inherently more unequal than others) could not drive this reversal, unless the revolutions triggered a different set of regional characteristics to reshape inequality. Appendix Table A.13, Columns 2-5 test the robustness of the reversal finding. Column 2 controls for the contemporary county development level proxied by nighttime luminosity in 2000; column 3 controls for the historical county development level, proxied by average educational attainment level in 1950; column 4 controls for a variety of geographic attributes that may be associated with either development or within-county inequality, such as land ruggedness and distance to major transport routes;[11] and finally, column 5 controls for county-level access to external and internal markets.[12] The negative relationship that we document in Column 1 remains largely unchanged. It is also robust to excluding coastal regions where rich households may

[10] The patterns observed in Appendix Table A.13 are robust to alternative thresholds — see Supplemental Table S.6

[11] The geographical controls include distances (km) to the shore, fast-speed road network, and major rivers, as well as the means and standard deviations of elevation and slope.

[12] External (resp., internal) market access is defined as the weighted sum of the populations (from the 1953 Census) in coastal (resp., non-coastal) counties. As is standard in the economic geography literature since Harris (1954), the weights are the inverse of the exponential of distance, measured in km. Coastal counties are defined as counties in provinces with access to the sea; the results are robust to defining coastal counties more narrowly as counties with direct sea access.

have been more likely to emigrate prior to the revolutions in order to evade confiscation (column 6) — such emigration of the wealthy could generate a reversal in inequality.

Finally, urbanization may induce households at the top of the income and wealth distribution to move to urban apartments that have smaller sizes than rural houses, and lead us to underestimate contemporary inequality and hence overestimate the inequality reversal over time. However, we find that the reversal in county-level inequality is remarkably robust to controlling for the urbanization rate in 2000 (proxied by the share of population in a given locality who hold an urban household registration, or *hukou*), as shown in Supplemental Table S.4.

Much of the movement toward equality comes from the compression of the difference between the above-median and median households. Appendix Figure A.9 decomposes the inequality reversal over time by different parts of the distribution. We estimate the correlation coefficients between the pre-Land Reform land Gini coefficient and the corresponding county's 2000 housing inequality. Instead of the overall Gini coefficient of 2000 housing inequality, we construct a separate inequality measure for each decile as the ratio between the $X^{\text{th}}$ and $50^{\text{th}}$ percentiles of the housing size in 2000 in a given county, where $X$ ranges from 10 to 90. We trace out $X$ along the x-axis, and the corresponding correlation coefficient estimates on the y-axis. We reverse the ratios if $X < 50$, so that one can interpret negative coefficients across the entire spectrum of $X$ as indicating a reversal between historical and contemporary inequality. The estimated coefficients for percentiles below the median are in general indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that the reversal in equality did not occur among the lower half of the distribution in terms of housing size. This does not indicate a resurgence of historical inequality either — coefficient estimates close to zero suggest that the reshuffling of historical inequality is fairly persistent among below-median households. However, one begins to observe an increasingly negative coefficient as $X$ increases beyond 50.

In Appendix Table A.14, we further investigate the underpinnings of the reversal in county-level inequality. We interact the pre-revolution land Gini coefficient with various time-invariant county characteristics that we expect, based on the literature, to have affected income and wealth distributions differently before and after the Mao era. This heterogeneity analysis shows that the reversal pattern is observed in counties that have better access to domestic markets.

Finally, the Communist and Cultural Revolutions may have had a persistent impact by altering local collective preferences (and norms). We investigate whether the revolutions affected the overall preference toward inequality and redistribution in a given county. Specifically, we examine the county-level average answer to the following survey question related to redistribution and inequality, as elicited in the CFPS in 2010:

> To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
> For the economy to thrive, one needs to enlarge income inequality in the population.
> 1 = extremely disagree
> 5 = extremely agree

In Appendix Table A.15, we look at the relationship between pre-revolution land ownership inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) and the contemporary average attitude toward inequality in the corresponding county. One sees that counties that were more unequal prior to the Land Reform display substantially lower tolerance toward inequality. This association is robust even controlling for cohort and income at the time of the survey, as shown in Columns 2 and 3. In

other words, the Communist Revolution and the Cultural Revolution appear to have generated a lasting impact across Chinese rural counties — rural counties that were more unequal prior to the revolutions have become collectively less tolerant of inequality.

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# Appendix S Supplemental figures and tables

**Figure S.1:** Measuring land during the Land Reform.


**Figure S.2:** Students chanting revolutionary slogans at Peking University during the Cultural Revolution.




**Figure S.3:** This figure gives a graphical illustration of the Gini coefficient calculation.




**Figure S.4:** Comparing land Gini with and without housing amenity adjustments

**Table S.1:** Correlation between county-level Gini and Theil indices

| | Gini adj. | Gini raw | Theil raw |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gini adjusted | 1.0000 | | |
| Gini raw | 0.9534 | 1.0000 | |
| Thiel raw | 0.9188 | 0.9598 | 1.0000 |

Notes: This table presents correlation coefficients for various measures of land ownership inequality from the *County Gazetteers*. The measures are (1) Gini coefficients with adjustment based on housing amenities, (2) the raw Gini coefficients, and (3) the Theil index.

**Table S.2:** Comparison of province and county gazetteer land ownership data

| | Province gazetteer | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| County gazetteer | 1.055*** | 1.019*** | 0.976*** | 1.010*** | 1.015*** |
| | (0.068) | (0.079) | (0.103) | (0.117) | (0.113) |
| Weights | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Province FE | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Class FE | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Period FE | No | No | No | No | Yes |

Notes: This table regresses average land shares from *Province Gazetteers* on average land shares from *County Gazetteers*. Each observation is a province-period-class, where period can be pre- or post-Land Reform, and class refers to the five class labels. The weights are the number of counties based on which the province-level data in the *Province Gazetteers* are computed (when this information is missing, we assume it is the same as the number of counties available in the *County Gazetteers*). Sample: all matched province-period-class observations in province and county gazetteers (N = 64).

**Table S.3:** Summary statistics — 2000 Population Census

| Panel A: education and real estate | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | S.D. | Median | $25^{th}$ Percentile | $75^{th}$ Percentile |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Years of Education | 7.043 | 3.342 | 6.000 | 6.000 | 9.000 |
| Years of Education (born before 1950 | 4.498 | 3.852 | 6.000 | 0.000 | 6.000 |
| Housing Area per capita | 26.293 | 19.136 | 21.333 | 15.000 | 32.000 |
| Amenity-adjusted Housing Area | 33.284 | 26.004 | 26.400 | 17.875 | 40.000 |
| Amenity Adjustment Factor | 0.243 | 0.148 | 0.200 | 0.200 | 0.300 |

| Panel B: migration | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Non-migrant or Same County | Other county, Same Province | Other Province |
| Migration by birth place | 94.99% | 2.93% | 2.09% |
| Migration by place of registration | 98.17% | 0.70% | 1.12% |
| Migration in 1995–2000 | 98.23% | 0.73% | 1.05% |

Notes: Panel A summarizes the distribution (mean, standard deviation, median, $25^{th}$ percentile, and $75^{th}$ percentile) of five key variables from the 2000 Population Census in the 410 counties with more than 80 households and valid pre-reform Gini data: years of education, years of education of the population born before 1950, housing area per capita (in $m^2$), amenity adjustment factor, and amenity-adjusted housing area (see text for details). Panel B summarizes migration by birth place, migration by place of household registration (*hukou*), and migration between 1995 and 2000 among agricultural *hukou* holders. The population is classified into three categories: non-migrants or migrants who moved within their birth county (resp. their county of registration, or their county of residence in 1995), migrants who crossed a county boundary but still reside in their birth province (resp. their province of registration, or their province of residence in 1995), and migrants living in a different province than the one their were born in (resp., their province of registration, or their province of residence in 1995). Sample: random 1% extract of the 2000 Population Census (N = 2,800,769).

**Table S.4:** Robustness: county-level inequality persistence with urbanization control

| | Gini (Amenity-adjusted Housing Area per capita) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Panel A: full specification of Table A.13 | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.018** | -0.018** | -0.019* | -0.020* | -0.024* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| Panel B: with urbanization rate control | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.018** | -0.018** | -0.019* | -0.020* | -0.024* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| # observations | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 411 |
| Control for province FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 2000 night light level | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 1950 education level | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for geographic attributes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for market access | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Regions | All | All | All | All | All | Non-coastal |

Notes: This table reports the relation between the pre-reform land Gini and the 2000 Gini of the amenity-adjusted housing area per capita. Panel A reports the full specification of Table A.13, Panel B introduces the urbanization control. The urbanization rate is defined as the percentage of the county population with a non-agricultural household registration, or *hukou*. Columns are defined as in Table A.13. Standard errors accounting for arbitrary spatial correlation (Colella et al., 2019) within a 300-km radius are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: counties with more than 80 households in the random 1% extract of the 2000.

**Table S.5:** Robustness: county-level inequality persistence with different amenity adjustments

| | Housing Area per capita Gini | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Panel A: Gini of Unadjusted Housing Area | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.017** | -0.017** | -0.017** | -0.018** | -0.020* | -0.025** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.013) |
| Panel B: Equal-weighted Amenity | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.018** | -0.018** | -0.019* | -0.020* | -0.024* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| Panel C: PCA-weighted Amenity | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.017** | -0.017** | -0.017** | -0.019** | -0.020* | -0.025** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.013) |
| # observations | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 411 |
| Control for province FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 2000 night light level | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 1950 education level | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for geographic attributes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for market access | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Regions | All | All | All | All | All | Non-coastal |

Notes: This table reports different adjustments for housing amenities. We consider six indicator variables from the 2000 Census: 1. multistory house, 2. independent kitchen, 3. fuel or gas access, 4. tap water access, 5. hot bath, and 6. in-unit restroom. Total amenity inflator is assumed to be 0.6. Panel A reports the housing Gini coefficient calculated with the raw housing area per capita (in $m^2$). Panel B adjusts the housing area for all factors equally. Panel C adjusts the housing area with the following PCA loadings for the six different factors: 19.69%, 8.72%, 22.29%, 18.91%, 21.33%, and 9.05%, respectively. Columns are defined as in Table A.13. Standard errors accounting for arbitrary spatial correlation (Colella et al., 2019) within a 300-km radius are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table S.6:** Robustness: county-level inequality persistence with different sampling criteria

| | Gini (Amenity-adjusted Housing Area per capita) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Panel A: all matched counties | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.018** | -0.018** | -0.018* | -0.019* | -0.023* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| # observations | 574 | 574 | 574 | 574 | 574 | 413 |
| Panel B: counties with $>$ 50 households | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.018** | -0.018** | -0.019* | -0.020* | -0.024* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| # observations | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 411 |
| Panel C: counties with $>$ 80 households | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.018** | -0.018** | -0.019* | -0.020* | -0.024* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.013) |
| # observations | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 572 | 411 |
| Panel D: counties with $>$ 100 households | | | | | | |
| Pre-revolution land Gini | -0.019** | -0.019** | -0.019** | -0.019** | -0.020* | -0.025* |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.013) |
| # observations | 568 | 568 | 568 | 568 | 568 | 407 |
| Control for province FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 2000 night light level | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for 1950 education level | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for geographic attributes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Control for market access | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Regions | All | All | All | All | All | Non-coastal |

Notes: Panels A, B, C, and D report estimations with county samples including more than 0, 50, 80, and 100 households, respectively (the benchmark in Table A.13 is more than 80 households). Columns are defined as in Table A.13. Standard errors accounting for arbitrary spatial correlation (Colella et al., 2019) within a 300-km radius are in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

**Table S.7:** Breakdown of inequality into deciles

| | Amenity-adjusted Gini | $10^{th}/50^{th}$ | $20^{th}/50^{th}$ | $30^{th}/50^{th}$ | $40^{th}/50^{th}$ | $60^{th}/50^{th}$ | $70^{th}/50^{th}$ | $80^{th}/50^{th}$ | $90^{th}/50^{th}$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| Panel B: Counties with any household | | | | | | | | | |
| Gini | -0.0190** | 0.0118 | 0.0119 | 0.00769 | 0.00342 | -0.0174* | -0.0349** | -0.0636** | -0.152*** |
| | (0.00757) | (0.0130) | (0.0113) | (0.00936) | (0.00755) | (0.00949) | (0.0170) | (0.0282) | (0.0549) |
| Panel B: Counties with more than 80 households | | | | | | | | | |
| Gini | -0.0190** | 0.0118 | 0.0119 | 0.00769 | 0.00342 | -0.0174* | -0.0349** | -0.0636** | -0.152*** |
| | (0.00757) | (0.0130) | (0.0113) | (0.00936) | (0.00755) | (0.00949) | (0.0170) | (0.0282) | (0.0549) |
| Panel B: Counties with more than 100 households | | | | | | | | | |
| Gini | -0.0191** | 0.0112 | 0.0105 | 0.00563 | 0.00384 | -0.0139 | -0.0310* | -0.0583** | -0.157*** |
| | (0.00760) | (0.0130) | (0.0113) | (0.00933) | (0.00762) | (0.00941) | (0.0168) | (0.0281) | (0.0552) |

Notes: This table reports the coefficients used in Figure A.9 (Panel B), along with coefficients using different samples (Panels A and C). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Sample: counties in the random 1% extract of the 2000 Census with available pre-Land Reform land distribution data; N for counties with any household = 574, N for counties with $>$ 80 households = 572, N for counties with $>$ 80 households = 568.