Department of Economics
Brigham Young University
130 Faculty Office Building
Provo, UT 84602-2363
Institutional Affiliation: Brigham Young University
Information about this author at RePEc
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|February 2016||Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search|
with , : w22038
We present a new equilibrium search model where consumers initially search among discount opportunities, but are willing to pay more as a deadline approaches, eventually turning to full-price sellers. The model predicts equilibrium price dispersion and rationalizes discount and full-price sellers coexisting without relying on ex-ante heterogeneity. We apply the model to online retail sales via auctions and posted prices, where failed attempts to purchase a good reveal consumers' reservation prices. We find robust evidence supporting the theory, and demonstrate that ignoring buyer deadlines can distort estimates of market welfare, consumer demand, and underlying causes of market shifts.
|October 2011||Sticking with What (Barely) Worked|
with , : w17477
Outcome bias occurs when an evaluator considers ex-post outcomes when judging whether a choice was correct, ex-ante. We formalize this cognitive bias in a simple model of distorted Bayesian updating. We then examine strategy changes made by professional football coaches. We find they are more likely to revise their strategy after a loss than a win -- even for narrow losses, which are uninformative about future success. This increased revision following a loss occurs even when a loss was expected, and the offensive strategy is revised even when failure is attributable to the defense. These results are consistent with our model's predictions.
|January 2010||Pay-to-Bid Auctions|
with , : w15695
We analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price. Bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller, but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions. Our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices, which we test against observed auction data. Our model fits the data well for over three-fourths of routinely auctioned items. The notable exceptions are video game paraphernalia, which show more aggressive bidding and higher expected revenue. By incorporating mild risk-loving preferences in the model, we explain nearly all of the auctions.
Published: The Role of Risk Preferences in Pay-to-Bid Auctions Autores: Brennan C. Platt, Joseph Price, Henry Tappen Localización: Management science: journal of the Institute for operations research and the management sciences, ISSN 0025-1909, Vol. 59, Nº. 9, 2013, págs. 2117-2134