Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin - Madison
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706
NBER Program Affiliations:
NBER Affiliation: Research Associate
Institutional Affiliation: University of Wisconsin at Madison
NBER Working Papers and Publications
|January 2020||Interaction of the Labor Market and the Health Insurance System: Employer-Sponsored, Individual, and Public Insurance|
with Naoki Aizawa: w26713
We study regulations on the health insurance system for working-age U.S. households, consisting of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI), individual health insurance exchange (HIX), and Medicaid. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model with rich heterogeneity across local markets, households, and firms, which highlights the inter-relationship between various components of the health insurance system as well as their relationship with the labor market. We estimate the model exploiting variations across states and policy environments before and after the Affordable Care Act. In counterfactual experiments, we consider policies to cross subsidize between ESHI and HIX, which include pure risk pooling between the two markets as a special case. We find such policies would benefit most h...
|November 2019||Government Expenditure on the Public Education System|
with Shoya Ishimaru, John Kennan: w26425
We investigate equilibrium impacts of federal policies such as free-college proposals, taking into account that human capital production is cumulative and that state governments have resource constraints. In the model, a state government cares about household welfare and aggregate educational attainment. Realizing that household choices vary with its decisions, the government chooses income tax rates, per-student expenditure levels on public K-12 and college education, college tuition and the provision of other public goods, subject to its budget constraint. We estimate the model using data from the U.S. Using counterfactual simulations, we find that free-public-college policies, mandatory or subsidized, would decrease state expenditure on and hence the quality of public education. More st...
|May 2018||Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: the Boston Mechanism vs. Its Alternatives|
with Caterina Calsamglia, Maia Güell: w24588
We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM to the Deferred Acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by 1,020 euros, while a change to the top trading cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by 460 euros.
Published: Caterina Calsamiglia & Chao Fu & Maia Güell, 2020. "Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives," Journal of Political Economy, vol 128(2), pages 642-680.