NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
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Veikko Thiele

School of Business
Queen's University
Goodes Hall
143 Union Street
Kingston, Ontario
Canada

E-Mail: EmailAddress: hidden: you can email any NBER-related person as first underscore last at nber dot org
Institutional Affiliation: Queen’s University

NBER Working Papers and Publications

October 2020A Theory of Voluntary Testing and Self-isolation in an Ongoing Pandemic
with Thomas F. Hellmann: w27941
Thinking beyond Covid-19, there is a growing interest in what economic structures will be needed to face ongoing pandemics. In this paper we focus on the diagnostic problem and examine a new paradigm of voluntary self-testing by private individuals. People without symptoms face daily choices of either taking the risk of going out (to work and socialize), versus staying at home in self-isolation. Our theory shows that two types of people voluntary test themselves: those who otherwise would have self-isolated, and those who would have gone out indiscriminately. Our central insight is that the equilibrium infection risk falls when home-based testing becomes cheaper and easier to use, even if tests are not always accurate. Our results challenge the clinical mainstream view that diagnostic test...
November 2018May the Force be With You: Investor Power and Company Valuations
with Thomas Hellmann: w25211
This paper examines the effect of investor power in a model of staged equity financing. It shows how the usual effect where market power reduces valuations can be reversed in later rounds. Once they become insiders, powerful investors may use their market power to increase, not decrease valuations. Even though powerful investors initially lower valuations, companies prefer to bring them inside to leverage their power in later financing rounds. The paper also makes predictions about investor returns, and issues a warning that unrealized interim returns can be misleading predictors of final realized returns when powerful investors distort interim valuations.
May 2014Friends or Foes: The Interrelationship between Angel and Venture Capital Markets
with Thomas F. Hellmann: w20147
This paper develops a theory of how angel and venture capital markets interact. Entrepreneurs first receive angel then venture capital funding. The two investor types are 'friends' in that they rely upon each other's investments. However, they are also 'foes', because at the later stage the venture capitalists no longer need the angels. Using a costly search model we derive the equilibrium deal flows across the two markets, endogenously deriving market sizes, competitive structures, valuation levels, and exit rates. We discuss how the model generates alternative testable hypotheses for the recent rise of angel investing.

Published: Hellmann, Thomas & Thiele, Veikko, 2015. "Friends or foes? The interrelationship between angel and venture capital markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 639-653. citation courtesy of

October 2012A Theory of the Firm based on Partner Displacement
with Thomas F. Hellmann: w18495
We develop a new theory of the firm where asset owners sometimes want to change partners ex-post. The model identifies a fundamental trade-off between (i) a "displacement externality" under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though the benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii), a "retention externality" under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. Renegotiation cannot eliminate these inefficiencies when agents are wealth constrained. When there is more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more and retention externality less, so that integration becomes more attractive. Our model also predicts that integration always provides stronger incentives for specific investments, and that wealthy owners actu...
 
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